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Abstract 
Eurosodom: Examining Weaponized Sexuality and Gender-Based 
Narratives in Russian and Pro-Russian Disinformation 
Ellery Grace Cushman, M.G.P.S.; M.A.  
The University of Texas at Austin, 2020 
Supervisor: Mary Neuburger, Co-Supervisor: Lorinc Redei 
The Kremlin, under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, has sponsored a 
resurgence of political warfare against Western targets. This analysis will focus on a 
particular aspect of Kremlin-sponsored political warfare: sexuality and gender-based 
narratives in Russian and pro-Russian sponsored disinformation campaigns targeting EU 
and aspiring members from 2014-2020. The potency of these narratives arises from the 
emotional and cognitive load that they elicit. Their significance is often overlooked in 
security, intelligence, and communication studies.  
In order to alleviate this gap, this thesis consists of a mixed-methods analysis in 
order to analyze the role and function of these narratives within the larger body of 
Russian disinformation and the intended effects of targeted demographics’ consumption 
of these narratives. This research shows that sexuality and gender-based disinformation 
narratives are designed to target basic human emotions, such as fear, anger, hostility, 
confusion, and disgust by exploiting existing cognitive biases within the targeted 
population. These narratives are a useful and effective political and propaganda tool 
meant to elicit support for a specific brand of traditional values that furthers the 
Kremlin’s geopolitical aim of creating an alternative to Western liberal hegemony. These 
metanarratives designate the West as a bastion of moral and material decadence and 
deviance, and Russia as the savior of traditional Christendom because of its adherence to 
traditionality and rejection of liberal multiculturalism. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 2016 U.S. presidential election, disinformation has come to feature 
heavily in American political discourse. In recent years, scholars and policy practitioners 
have recognized the global drift towards “post-truth politics” or a “post-truth era” for 
some time now.1 In Germany – postfaktisch, in China – hòu zhēnxiāng, in Brazil – 
posverdad, in Turkey, India, France, Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and many other countries, fear of decreasing adherence to truth and fact have driven 
political and cultural conversations. Simultaneously, the last ten years have been marred 
by the global rise of right-wing populism. The past decade has brought the ascent of 
populist parties in Austria, Brazil, Germany, Italy, India, Indonesia, and Poland, the 
election of Donald J. Trump, the Brexit vote in Britain, and the rise of at least 20 populist 
leaders in executive office around the world.2 The roots of this populist growth date back 
to the early 21st century; however, “what the 2010s did… was give populist parties the 
ecosystem they needed to thrive,” partly due to the digital revolution and the rise of 
alternative media platforms.3 
 
1 Schwartz, Ian (28 November 2016). "George Will: "Post-Factual Politics" From Campaign Still Exists, 
Nixon More Of A Statesman Than Current Leadership". RealClearPolitics.com. Retrieved 8 November 
2017. 
2 Yasmeen Serhan, “Populism is Morphing in Insidious Ways,” The Atlantic, 2020. 
3 Serhan, “Populism is Morphing in Insidious Ways.” See also:.Bertin Martens, et al., “The digital 
transformation of news media and the rise of disinformation and fake news,” JRS Technical Reports: 
European Commission; April 2018.; Jennifer Curtis, “Fake News and Anthropology: A Conversation on 
Technology, Trust, and Publics in an Age of Mass Disinformation.” PoLAR: Political and Legal 
Anthropology Review (blog), February 16, 2020.  
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The advent of new digital media has allowed for increasingly democratized and 
decentralized news content at all levels of creation and dissemination, changing the shape 
of both legitimate news and propaganda. Older media platforms, such as cable news, 
have also adapted to the Digital Age. The American media infrastructure has begun to 
focus on performativity to satiate the attention economy, leading to a monopolization of 
news with high emotional content and headline grabbing stories. In the past 20 years, the 
24-hour news cycle, focusing on constant coverage rather than the quality of coverage, 
has created a system that allows for easier manipulation and inclusion of unverified 
information into the mainstream.4  
These changes in the information system have combined with factors such as 
socioeconomic polarization and inherent characteristics of cognitive processing, 
especially cognitive biases, to drive increasing mistrust in institutions and conspiratorial 
thinking in the U.S. The RAND Corporation defines “truth decay” as consisting of four 
characteristics: 1) increasing disagreement about the facts and analytical interpretation of 
facts and data; 2) a blurring of the line between opinion and fact; 3) the increasing 
relative volume, and resulting influence, of opinion and personal experience over fact; 
and 4) declining trust in formerly respected sources of factual information.5 The U.S. has 
seen “truth decay” in three other historical eras beyond today: 1) the Gilded Age and the 
rise of yellow journalism; 2) the 1920s and 1930s known for “jazz journalism,” the mass 
 
4 Dominc Boyer and Alexei Yurchak, “American Stiob: Or, What Late-Socialist Aesthetics of Parody 
Reveal about Contemporary Political Culture in the West,” Cultural Anthropology 25, no. 2 (2010). 
5 Jennifer Kavanaugh and Michael D. Rich, “Truth Decay: An Initial Exploration of the Diminishing Role 
of Facts and Analysis in American Public Life,” RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, 2018).  
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dissemination of radios, and the birth of the tabloid; and 3) the era of the Vietnam War, 
with “New Journalism” and increased concerns about government and media 
propaganda. These three eras and the current day saw a blurring of the line between 
opinion and fact and the increasing volume of opinion and personal experience over fact. 
However, the level of distrust in institutions is more pronounced today than in the past.6 
In the United States, public trust in the federal government, media, and other important 
institutions has continued to move to a historic low in recent decades. In 2019, PEW 
estimated that only 17% of Americans say that they can “trust the government in 
Washington to do what is right ‘just about always’ (3%) or ‘most of the time’ (14%).”7 
Today, with an increasing number of high-level officials in the US Government 
espousing conspiratorial thinking over data, falsities over truth, and opinion over fact, the 
need to understand the cultural structures and emotional logic that allow disinformation 
to flourish in society has never been greater.  
Although the phenomenon of “post-truth” and the popularity of conspiracy 
theories have been a long-standing aspect of American history, advances in technology in 
the Digital Age have altered the way that foreign adversaries conduct influence 
operations—bringing them out from the shadows and onto social media feeds.8 The 
changing information ecosystems in Europe and the U.S. have become ripe for foreign 
 
6 Kavanaugh and Rich, “Truth Decay,” 2018.  
7 PEW Research, “Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019,” PEW (Washington D.C., 2019). 
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-1958-2019/ 
8 John Keane, “Post-truth politics and why the antidote isn’t simply ‘fact-checking’ and truth,” The 
Conversation, 2018, https://theconversation.com/post-truth-politics-and-why-the-antidote-isnt-simply-fact-
checking-and-truth-87364 
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interference during our era of resurging near-peer competition and “return to great power 
politics,” a revitalization of a multipolar system similar to that that preceded the Cold 
War two power system.9 The modern international system is often described as 
experiencing a Although it was predicted that the 21st century would be the era of 
American predominance, powers such as China, Russia, and European Union member 
states have equalized this order. For the Russian Federation under the leadership of 
Vladimir Putin, non-military activities, especially operations in the information space, are 
an effective force multiplier that can even the international playing field as the Kremlin 
attempts to reassert itself as a major global power. 
Indeed, it has been well established that the Kremlin has sponsored a resurgence 
of political warfare against Western targets as a factor of ‘hybrid warfare’ that attempts to 
alter world power structures to create a multipolar world.10 Typically, ‘hybrid warfare’ is 
understood to combine both kinetic military and non-kinetic non-military activities, 
ranging from traditional covert action such as propaganda, information influence 
activities, political and economic activities, and sabotage, to paramilitary and military 
intervention.11 This thesis focuses on the non-kinetic aspects of Russian ‘hybrid warfare,’ 
which will be referred to as political warfare. 
 
9 Idrees Ali, “U.S. military puts ‘great power competition’ at heart of strategy: Mattis,” Reuters, 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-china-russia/u-s-military-puts-great-power-competition-at-
heart-of-strategy-mattis-idUSKBN1F81TR; Elbridge A. Colby and A. Wess Mitchell, “The Age of Great 
Power Competition: How the Trump Administration Refashioned American Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, 
2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-12-10/age-great-power-competition 
10 Kevin N. McCauley, Russian Influence Campaigns Against the West (North Charleston: CreateSpace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2016), 325; Christopher S. Chivvis, “Understanding Russian “Hybrid 
Warfare” and What Can Be Done About It,” RAND, 2017, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT468.html.  
11 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 257. 
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Policymakers and academics in the United States have focused almost exclusively 
on one factor of Kremlin-sponsored political warfare: Russian interference in the 2016 
American Presidential Election. However, Europe, and in particular the European Union 
and its aspiring members, has been the perennial target for the Kremlin in the post-Soviet 
era.12 These countries have been targeted since as early as 2007 and have become 
saturated with the non-kinetic instruments of hybrid warfare. This analysis will focus on a 
particular aspect of Kremlin-sponsored political warfare in Europe: Russian and pro-
Russian sponsored disinformation campaigns. Disinformation is specifically tailored for 
each target, manipulating, distorting, dismissing, or fabricating locally relevant 
information to substantiate some broader metanarrative that serves Russian interests. 
Russian and pro-Russian disinformation has become a popular topic in the news and 
academia, and scholars have focused on several elements of disinformation ranging from 
the role of advertising, to the technology used to disseminate false stories, to the 
motivations of threat actors, to the narrative content of disinformation. This analysis will 
consist of a content analysis of sexuality and gender-based narratives in Russian 
disinformation from a set time period and database. 
In this thesis, I will survey the narrative landscape of Russian disinformation in 
Europe from 2015 to present from a database of proven disinformation managed by the 
European External Action Service. This database, EU vs. Disinfo, is “the only searchable, 
open source repository of its kind—which currently comprises over 6,500 samples of 
 
12 McCauley, Russian Information Campaigns Against the West, 383; 384. 
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pro-Kremlin disinformation” in 32 languages.13 In scrutinizing this larger body of 
disinformation, an interesting trend emerged of false stories built on sexuality and 
gender-based narratives targeting the West that were reminiscent of classic atrocity 
propaganda that has characterized political warfare for centuries. This thesis focuses on 
those pieces of disinformation characterized by sexuality and gender-based narratives. In 
order to analyze these narratives, I conduct a mixed-methods analysis of this topic from 
this particular subsample, relying on qualitative methods, as well as feminist IR theory, 
rumor theory and theories of disgust, and critical discourse analysis (CDA). This thesis 
focuses on the three research questions: 
•  What the role and functionality of sexuality and gender-based narratives are 
within the larger body of Russian and pro-Russian disinformation from 2015-
2019?   
• What are the intended effects of targeted demographics’ consumption of 
sexuality and gender-based narratives?  
• Are the stories contained in these narratives heterogeneous or do they comply 
with a common prototype? 
My hypotheses are three-fold. First, sexuality and gender-based narrative are a kind of 
classic atrocity propaganda. They focus on the most intense of natural human emotions, 
such as fear, anger, hostility, confusion, and disgust, in order to exploit existing cognitive 
biases and create efficient cognitive shortcuts that can elicit desired behavioral or 
 
13 EU vs. Disinfo, “About,” https://euvsdisinfo.eu/about/ 
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cognitive change in the targeted population.14 As a result, sexuality and gender-based 
narratives, especially those that utilize language of atrocity, are potent psychological 
weapons in the Kremlin’s information warfare toolkit.  
Second, the intent of the utilization of these narratives is to sow confusion and 
incite moral panics in the targeted populations. Sexuality and gender-based narratives are 
not unlike other forms of disinformation in this way; their emotional load is so high that 
the target population is often overwhelmed with strong emotion, as mentioned above, 
which can lead to the classic “4D” effect of disinformation: dismiss, distort, distract, 
dismay.15 However, I hypothesize that sexuality and gender-based narratives serve 
Kremlin interests in another significant way. These narratives are employed to support 
broader geopolitical aims of the Russian Federation, namely increased distrust in the 
ideas of multiculturalism, tolerance, feminism, and liberalism expressed through an 
overall Eurosceptic worldview. Furthermore, these narratives create a real political and 
cultural alternative to Western liberal democracy that is modeled after Putin’s Russia, 
focusing on traditional imaginings of masculinity and femininity, the family unit, and 
other conservative Christian imagery.  
Third, stories that are characterized by sexuality and gender-based narratives are 
not random but conform to a common storyline pattern. They can typically be distilled 
down to one storyline with a perennial cast of characters that is easily recycled and 
adapted over time. This storyline is replete with dual imagery and binary oppositions that 
 
14 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011).  
15 Gourley, Seran, “To fight disinformation, we need to weaponize the truth, Wired, 2020, 
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/fix-disinformation-facts 
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seem to be contradictory, but that actually represent broad narratives that support one 
another. In this thesis, these broad narratives will be referred to as metanarratives, which 
are cross-cultural narrative systems that frequently reappear over long stretches of time, 
providing an explanatory framework that can be applied to a population’s interpretation 
of information.16 These metanarratives are meant to illicit emotional and cognitive 
support for Russian foreign policy and security objectives. When taken together, these 
images paint a complete picture: the West is a decaying power, a kind of ‘Eurosodom’ 
that has become a bastion of material decadence and moral deviance, which is now at the 
mercy of a resurgent Russia that is destined to rise up from historical tragedy to be the 
savior of “true Christian European” civilization.  
This analysis seeks to contribute to the existing research on Russian and pro-
Russian disinformation in three ways: First, by showing that sexuality and gender-based 
narratives in Russian disinformation target emotions such as fear, anger, hostility, 
confusion, and disgust. These narratives should be considered a geopolitical threat 
because they are designed to create confusion and incite moral panic in the targeted 
population, with the intended goal of advocating for a specific brand of traditionality and 
social structure which define the current worldview of the Kremlin. Central to this 
analysis is an understanding of the cultural and historical foundations that support the 
Kremlin’s use of othering discourse in their information operations. These ‘Others’ are 
remnants of an Imperial and Soviet past, frameworks of discrimination against Jews and 
 
16 Daniel Leonard Bernardi, Pauline Hope Cheong, Chris Lundry, and Scott W. Lundry, Narrative 
Landmines (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2012). 
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Muslims and an idea of a conspiring West that inform the Kremlin’s political rhetoric 
today. However, unlike in the past, the Kremlin today is predominantly relying on gender 
discourse and a scapegoating of LGBTQ+ populations in tandem with these older forms 
of othering to legitimize and reinforce the rule of President Vladimir Putin. 
This thesis proceeds by overviewing the theoretical devices from five fields of 
study – historical foundations of active measures, propaganda and disinformation studies, 
feminist IR theory, rumor theory and theories of disgust, and critical discourse analysis – 
in order to analyze disinformation characterized by sexuality and gender-based 
narratives. Through this analysis, I expect to confirm my hypotheses that: a) sexuality 
and gender-based narratives are designed to target basic human emotions, such as fear, 
anger, hostility, confusion, and disgust, in order to exploit existing cognitive biases 
within the targeted populations; b) the majority of the stories that utilize a sexuality or 
gender-based narrative in my dataset can be distilled down to one easily adaptable and 
reusable storyline; and c) sexuality and gender based narratives are employed in order to 
shape understanding and support for a specific brand of traditional values that serve the 
Kremlin’s greater geopolitical aims. Following this theoretical background, I will 
describe the methods utilized for the analysis of my sample. This will include a 
quantitative analysis of the sample and a narrative content analysis of the stories within 
the sample. Following methods, I will provide description and analysis of the seven 
metanarratives detected in the sample of disinformation from 2015 to present. The results 
of both the quantitative and qualitative analyses will then be discussed separately. I will 
conclude by providing substantive policy recommendations for policymakers and 
 10 
intelligence practitioners, with the aim of outlining the vital national security significance 
of sexuality and gender-based narratives in Russian and pro-Russian disinformation. 
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HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
HISTORICAL SCAPEGOATING AND INFORMATION WARFARE  
From the Imperial Era through the Soviet Union to today, scapegoating or 
‘othering’ has been a constantly present political and propaganda tool of Russian 
leadership. Of course, this phenomenon is in no way unique to Russian history and can be 
found at some time in nearly every country around the world; however, the Russian state 
does have a unique history of the phenomenon, in which the existence of these ‘Others’ 
has central importance to the formation of the Russian national identity. Throughout 
history, the groups that serve as the primary ‘Other’ for Russian leadership have shifted, 
evolved, and merged, but have predominantly focused on Muslims, Jews, and the West. 
Russian leadership has exploited the existence of these ‘Others’ for political legitimacy 
and to boost internal cohesion. 
Early understandings of an “Other” in the Russian imagination were centered 
around religious differences, Islam or Judaism as opposed to Orthodoxy. Throughout 
modern history, Russia has been at war with the Ottoman Empire more than any other 
power. This series of twelve wars between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire 
between the 17th and 20th centuries were instrumental in the forging of the Russian 
national identity in opposition to an Eastern, Islamic “Other,” especially as Russian 
leadership emphasized its “unique position as the only Christian Orthodox Empire.”17 
The wars were largely setbacks for the Ottomans, with the Russians gaining control of 
 
17 Kirill A. Fursov, “Russia and the Orthodox Empire: The Geopolitical Dimension,” Russian Studies in 
History 57, no. 2 (2018), 99. 
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the northern rim of the Black Sea and parts of the Balkans. Both the Ottoman Empire and 
the Russian Empire saw themselves as the bearers of true civilization, as seats to two 
great religions: Islam and Orthodoxy.18 Once the Russians gained control over parts of 
the Balkans and Eastern Europe, pan-Slavism in the form of a united Orthodox, Slavic-
speaking sphere became popular in the Russian imagination empire, encouraging anti-
Western sentiment and the beginnings of the West as an ‘Other’ in the Russian 
imagination.  
During the reign of Peter the Great, he sought to “impose Western ways” on the 
empire and to return the Russian Empire to the European fold.19  However, Peter came up 
against resistance from the clergy and conservative groups, who saw the West’s culture 
as a threat to their Orthodox tradition. By the 19th century, some members of the educated 
elite, known as Slavophiles, began to argue that Russia’s place was not with the West, but 
was in fact “fundamentally distinct from the sterile materialism and rationalism of the 
Latin World.”20 The Slavophiles believed that Russia’s identity lay in Eastern Europe, 
with those of a similar Orthodox religion. This debate over continental identity persists 
today.  
Another central ‘Other’ for the Imperial Russian regime were Jewish populations. 
Anti-Semitism was “the dominant modality of racialized Othering” in the Imperial 
 
18 Ishaan Tharoor, “How the rivalry between the Russians and the Turks shaped the world,” Washington 
Post, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/09/how-the-rivalry-between-
russians-and-turks-shaped-the-world/. 
19 David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).  
20 Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism, 4.  
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Russian state.21 Jews were believed to allies of the West, purveyors of radical leftism 
leading up to the revolution, and were of course a religious ‘Other.’ The most famous 
embodiment of official state-sponsored anti-Semitism was disinformation and fabrication 
operation that published the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The Protocols were a highly 
successful and effective political forgery, translated into multiple languages, that claimed 
to show a Jewish plot to take over the world.22 Although the Russian Revolution was 
officially meant to end the embedded anti-Semitism of the Imperial Regime in the name 
of an international and cosmopolitan revolution, the Soviet state invariably continued the 
legacy of anti-Semitism, especially under Joseph Stalin.  
The othering present during the Soviet period was a direct legacy of the 
frameworks established by the Tsarist regime, with some important distinctions. The 
Soviet Union was officially built on a non-religious, international movement, so the same 
kind of religious-based othering that existed during the Russian Empire was officially 
diminished. In practice however, official state atheism led to discrimination against 
religious groups, especially Muslim and Jewish communities who were forcibly 
assimilated and integrated into a common Soviet culture.  
Most significantly during the Soviet Era, the West became an even more principal 
‘Other,’ especially post-WWII. The idea of a Western ‘Other,’ who was conspiring to 
infiltrate and overthrow the Soviet state, was central to Soviet identity and provided 
 
21 Brendan McGeever, “Revolution and antisemitism: the Bolsheviks in 1917,” Patterns of Prejudice 51, 
no. 3-4 (2017).  
22 Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World-Conspiracy and the Protocols of 
the Elder of Zion (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 32–36.; Hadassa Ben-Itto, The Lie that Wouldn't Die: 
The Protocols of The Elders of Zion (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2005), 280.  
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legitimization of harsh political repression under Stalin. A distinctive feature of Stalinist 
repression were “conspiratorial witch hunts” that focused on “Jews as supposed agents of 
the West.”23 The idea of an internal enemy conspiring with the an external enemy (the 
West) was not new to the Soviet period, but had deep legacies during the Imperial Era, in 
which the Tsarist regime also considered Jews to be conspiring with revolutionary forces. 
During the Soviet Union, these frameworks were simply extended, and a “conspiring 
West” became an even greater embedded trope in the national identity and state-
making.24 
At the end of the Soviet period, the othering of the West began to abate as young 
people became more open to Western influences and Gorbachev pushed for more open 
and free governance.25 However, with the fall of the Soviet Union, a resurgence of 
Russian nationalism emerged, accompanied by the “enshrining of the belief of Russia’s 
right to protect the Russian minorities in the ‘near abroad;’ and subsequently, during the 
wars in the former Yugoslavia, the revival of traditional notions of protecting Russia’s 
Orthodox “brother Serbs,” and Russia’s hostility to the expansion of NATO.”26 As a 
result, many young people began “renegotiating their attitudes with the West” in the mid-
90s, increasingly coming to believe that “Western cultural forms and lifestyles” were an 
“alien imposition.”27 In this post-Soviet era, with increased Russian nationalism and anti-
 
23 Ben-Itto, The Lie that Wouldn't Die,” 280. 
24 Yablokov, Fortress Russia. 
25 Rosalind Marsh, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity: The Theme of “Russia and the West” in Post-Soviet 
Culture,” Nationalities Papers 35, no. 3 (2007). 
26 Marsh, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity,” 560 
27 Marsh, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity,” 561. 
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Western sentiment, the West was often depicted in a similar manner to that during the 
Imperial Era: as “capitalist exploiters, political enemies, or purveyors of decadent 
Western culture.”28 One significant Imperial-based ideal that reemerged during this time 
was the “traditional messianic view that Russia is a unique country which must pursue its 
own path of development that is necessarily different from that of the West, and that will 
have a special, distinctive role to play in the future.” (Marsh, 562). With the rise of 
Vladimir Putin, there has been а heightened awareness of the malign presence of 
“Others,” in the in the form of Westerner, Jew, or Muslim. Contemporary Russian 
politics “suggests that conventional views of a homogenized West as Russia’s ‘Other’ are 
by no means outdated” – indeed, they are becoming more prevalent in the 21st century 
with the ideals of Alexander Dugin and Eurasianism.29 Official values that have emerged 
in Putin’s Russia – autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationalism – have deep roots in both 
Imperial and Soviet Russia.30 
GENDER RELATIONS IN RUSSIAN HISTORY  
 When the Soviet Union fell, the former gender order came under attack. Leaders and 
citizens alike began to interpret the collapse of the USSR as “collective 
demasculinization” as the country lost its former status in the international system. Seeds 
of feminist thought started to emerge in the early years of the Soviet Union, after the first 
Soviet Constitution formally proclaimed gender equality in 1917. However, the 
 
28 Marsh, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity,” 561. 
29 Marsh, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity,” 561. 
30 Marsh, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity,” 561. 
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Bolsheviks never officially embraced the feminist movement. By the 1930s, the state 
apparatus began claiming that “women’s issues were largely solved.”31 Legally, the 
Soviet Union attempted to fulfill communist aspirations of equality: giving women access 
to jobs and encouraging their participation in the political process. During World War II, 
women were mass mobilized to take the place of men in the industrial economy. 
Although women’s employment expanded significantly, and women’s roles began to 
include work outside of the home, the overall balance of power in the gender hierarchy 
remained unchanged. Due to the “double burden” that women experienced, their 
inclusion in the wage economy provided an improvement in the status of women at a 
great cost.32 The dominant position of men in the social structure was never reconsidered. 
This illusory sense of equality lead to feminist rhetoric and policies controlled by the 
state, who, in practice, often still advocated traditional views of family and motherhood 
and declared unsanctioned feminism as “bourgeois.”33 
During perestroika, the feminist movement that had been growing underground for 
decades was brought into the public sphere.  Awareness of gender equality, women’s 
double burden, and the exclusion of meaningful inclusion of women at the decision-
making level became more widespread. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
women’s movements were once again marginalized, as increasingly patriarchal political 
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structures took hold.34 There was a strong backlash against state-sanctioned feminism and 
female emancipation that occurred during the Soviet period, especially as the collapse of 
the Soviet Union was depicted as the ultimate form of emasculation. 
 During the 1990s, calls to restore “collective male dignity” were actively utilized by 
anti-Communist political opposition groups. Yeltsin often feminized (demasculinized) his 
political opponents, but by the end of his tenure was considered to be old, “gut-boasting, 
boorish, [and] boozy.”35 As a result, Putin’s remasculinization strategy was two-fold. 
First, he sought to craft a new national identity defined by performances of strength, 
masculine political positioning for foreign and domestic audiences, and the reinforcement 
of traditional family and gender systems in order to reverse the demasculinization of 
Russia that accompanied the fall of the USSR. Second, he sought to differentiate himself 
from Yeltsin’s old and drunken performance of manhood by appearing youthful, athletic, 
and attractive, all while remaining a true man, or “muzhik.”36  
The revitalization and redefinition of the term muzhik has become central to the 
Russian national identity during Putin’s tenure. In Imperial Russia, the term muzhik was 
used to designate a male peasant, with different connotations from muzhchina, the 
standard word for man. During the Soviet Era, muzhik became a somewhat derogatory 
term for a “backward, ignorant, and potentially counterrevolutionary” man, defined in 
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opposition to the celebrated Soviet worker.37 However, during the Post-Soviet period, and 
especially during Putin’s rule, the term has been revitalized and has gained a new positive 
definition as a way to define a “real man.”38 The term and the idea of a “real Russian 
man” has become part of Putin’s political legitimization strategy.39 Putin has molded his 
own public image to align with that of a muzhik and the Kremlin takes an “active role in 
reproducing it and promoting it” among the Russian population.40 In this way, Putin was 
able to strategically redeploy gender discourse in a way that portrays a return to 
traditionality, while really serving as an important vector of new ideological goals. 
 
Gender and Political Masculinities in Contemporary Russia:  
Gender is a crucial element of the social order. Ideas of masculinity and femininity 
overlay all aspects of public and private life and organize ideas of nation, class, and 
culture. 41 As Riabova and Riabov (2019) state, gender discourse has “broader relevance 
and significance beyond the scope of sexual relations, because [gender] contributes to 
maintaining the collective identity, establishing social inequality, and providing political 
mobilization.” The gendered political performance of right-wing populist leaders such as 
Vladimir Putin, Recep T. Erdogan, and Jair Bolsonaro have been extensively studied by 
 
37 Sperling, Sex, Politics, and Putin, pg. 36.; Riabov and Riabova, “The Remasculinization of Russia.” 
38 Sperling, Sex, Politics, and Putin, pg. 37. 
39 Sperling, Sex, Politics, and Putin, pg. 38. 
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scholars. Reliance on gendered discourses and paternalist metaphors is increasingly 
common in right-wing populist parties around the world.42 The relationship between 
gender and right-wing populism is central to understanding the ways that male populist 
leaders posture themselves both domestically and on the international stage.  
As critical discourse analyst Teun A. Van Dijk has shown, “ideologies seldom express 
themselves directly in text and talk; rather, they work indirectly, often concealing both 
their origins and effects.”43 As Eksi and Wood (2019) argue, it is likely no accident that 
so many right-wing politicians engage in masculine, “macho,” and strongman approaches 
in their public discourse and actions.44  Eksi and Wood describe these behaviors as 
“political masculinities” — “the conscious or unconscious (often semi-conscious) 
performance of masculine stereotypes by individuals operating within the political 
sphere.45 Right-wing populist political masculinities are distinct from other displays of 
masculinity in the political sphere because of their explicit goal of undermining 
democratic infrastructures. As Eksi and Wood argue, these masculine performances can 
be “designed to create spectacle” in order to distract the populace from serious economic 
problems. However, these performances are often central to the legitimacy of right-wing 
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populist leaders, where a cult of masculinity is built at the top of the power structure 
which creates a necessity for a strong, sometimes openly aggressive, masculine leader.  
Since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, scholars have recognized a 
“remasculinization” of Russian domestic politics and in the state’s international posturing 
and version of national security.46 Issues of gender and nationalism are often utilized in 
“legitimizing the transition from one social system to another,” and gender discourse has 
long played a significant role in the way that the Russian state and leadership construct 
national identity.47  
In the specific case of President Vladimir Putin, gender discourse and masculine 
imagery has been an explicit strategy of the Kremlin to legitimize both Putin and his 
regime as a defender of the Russian state and people, living inside and outside Russia.48 
The images of Putin are well known around the world: shirtless on a horse, surrounded by 
women declaring their love for him, shooting guns and hunting, and partaking in a 
plethora of athletic events. Vladimir Putin has effectively created what Eksi and Wood 
describe as “Janus-faced masculinity,” where he is an “outsider-yet-insider and a bad-
boy-yet-good-father.”49 Putin is simultaneously an everyman and unlike any other man. 
His form of masculinity is not just one of heightened superficial machismo performances, 
but a more diverse repertoire of behaviors that combine bullying, masculinity, 
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paternalism, and deeply conservative messaging.50 Putin has been both overly aggressive 
abroad, and paternalistic and protective of the Russian people.  
As part of this image, Putin has created a position for himself as the “savior of the 
nation for whom intermediate institutions are only a hinderance.”51 Putin’s reliance on 
nationalist rhetoric has meant establishing a strong state that carries the appearance of 
direct communication between the ruler and the ruled. Putin demonstrates his personal 
connection to the Russian people through radio programs and television broadcasts where 
he speaks directly to the people, omitting any intermediary institution. One example of 
this is the annual “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin” (Прямая линия с Владимиром 
Путиным) 52 These kinds of activities have legitimized the top-down breakdown of 
intermediate, mediating institutions between President Putin and the people.53  
Scholars such as Riabov and Riabova (2017) and Sperling (2015) argue that the 
“re-masculinization of Russia” is central to Putin’s political legitimacy and is largely the 
reason that Kremlin, and Putin himself, have remained popular with domestic 
audiences.54 In contrast, Novitskaya (2017) argues that his specific brand of political 
masculinity is a reflection of “deeper anxieties and vulnerabilities that result in political 
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overcompensation.”55 This research assumes that both of these understandings can be true 
at once. Clearly, Putin has crafted his image and masculine performance as a 
legitimization strategy since returning to power for the second time. This strategy has 
bled over from politics into Russian popular culture, playing a vital role in regard to 
“nationalism and how ‘the nation’ is constructed with the aid of ideas of masculinity and 
femininity.”56 As Valerie Sperling argues, this kind of legitimization tactic is not unique 
to Russia, but is in fact a widespread, universal phenomenon: the use and abuse of the 
power of gender norms and sexualization as a means of political legitimation.57 In this 
way, “the cultural framing of masculinity under patriarchy makes the assertion of 
masculinity a vehicle for power,” thereby enabling male political leaders to “assert their 
power over others who can be identified or characterized as traditionally feminine.”58 
This allows traditionally masculine leaders to rely on the use of gender discourse and 
norms, including “machismo, homophobia, and gay-baiting,” as a way to delegitimize 
their political adversaries, both domestic and foreign.59  
 This strategy has been central to Putin’s domestic positioning, which relies on a 
traditional binary of masculinity and femininity, in which each sex has specific and 
distinct roles and non-heterosexual individuals are marginalized if not nonexistent in 
Russian society.60 Putin has effectively combined gender discourse, as thinly veiled 
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xenophobia, with nationalism to embolden the latent populist sentiments in the general 
population against out-groups that do not fit into the new national identity. Putin often 
makes broad pronouncements about the “real Russians” who are depicted as brave and 
masculine, contrasting them with those who are cowardly and emasculated (i.e. feminine 
or semi-feminine).61 Sexual and gender minorities in particular have become an outgroup 
that the Kremlin depicts as foreign, as not emerging from Russia, but as being corrupted 
and immortalized by the West as a way to weaken Russia from within. This allows the 
Kremlin to not just discriminate against sexual and gender minorities, but to depict them 
as a threat to national security.  
The clearest example of this the so-called ‘gay propaganda’ law. In 2013, the 
national legislature dominated by United Russia passed the law “for the Purpose of 
Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family 
Values,” which bans “propaganda of nontraditional sexual relations” in the presence of 
minors – “a reference universally understood to mean a ban on providing children with 
access to information about the lives of LGBT people.”62 Russian-American journalist 
Masha Gessen argues that Putin relies on non-heterosexual individuals to mobilize 
against in order to legitimize his own heavy hand.63 Similarly, Fierstein (2013) describes 
this as a scapegoating strategy of “making-you-visible-so-we-could-hate-you,” and 
 
61 Eksi and Wood, “Right-wing populism as gendered performance,” 14. 
62 RFE/RL, “’A Living Hell’: Russia’s ‘Propaganda’ Law Damaging LGBT Youth, HRW Finds,” Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-gay-propaganda-law-
rights/29651416.html. 
63 Alexandra Novitskaya, “Patriotism, sentiment and male hysteria: Putin’s masculinity politics and the 
persecution of non-heterosexual Russians,” International Journal for Masculinity Studies (2019).; Harvey 
Fierstein, “Russia’s Anti-Gay Crackdown,” New York Times, 2013, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/opinion/russias-anti-gay-crackdown.html. 
 24 
argues that Russian leadership’s attack on non-heterosexual citizens is an attempt to 
distract and divide the citizenry’s attention from the real problems of corruption and 
economic woes. Most importantly though, Putin’s attack on sexual and gender minorities 
as a Western phenomenon allows the Kremlin to have a constant enemy conspiring to 
undermine the country. As a result, the Kremlin has described most democratic 
opposition groups, in the entire post-Soviet space, as being feminine, gay, and funded by 
the West.64 
Putin’s performative masculinity has transformed Russian foreign policy in recent 
years, as Russia’s foreign policy is increasingly categorized as ‘masculine’ or 
‘aggressive.’ This has especially been the case when considering Russia’s posturing 
towards NATO and the Ukraine crisis.65 This strategy has allowed the Kremlin to 
weaponize gender norms as a way to weaken the legitimacy of the West in the eyes of 
both Russian domestic audiences and foreign audiences that believe in a return to a 
traditional gender and family order. In Ukraine, gender discourse has encouraged the 
integration of the “true Slavic family,” juxtaposing it with the immoral practices of 
Europe.66 At the same time, Putin’s overreliance on so-called Western ‘gender 
ideologies’ can be understood as a reflection of his own anxiety and insecurity on the 
international stage as he attempts to rebuild Russia to the global power that the Soviet 
Union was.  
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Propaganda, Modern Hybrid Warfare, and Heuristics 
PROPAGANDA  
Propaganda has traditionally been viewed as a psychological weapon meant to influence 
the views of a targeted population in order to benefit the propagandist in some way—a 
policy change at a governmental level or a behavioral or cognitive shift on societal or 
individual levels. Jowett and O’Donnell define propaganda as “the deliberate, systematic 
attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate conditions, and direct behavior to achieve a 
response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”67 In his book Influence: The 
Psychology of Perception, Robert Cialdini outlines six universal principles of influence: 
1) reciprocation; 2) commitment and consistency, 3) social proof, 4) liking, 5) authority, 
and 6) scarcity.68 Pratkanis and Turner emphasize the use of cognitive tools and 
exploitation of cognitive biases to effect change, defining propaganda as “attempts to 
move a recipient to a predetermined point of view by using simple images and slogans 
that truncate thought by playing on prejudices and emotions.”69   
In recent years, academics have begun to define a form of “new propaganda” that 
is not only meant to “alter people’s views in support of certain policies, but to induce 
them into a state of self-defeating and endemic skepticism by undermining the very 
criteria on the basis of which they develop their cognitive abilities to make sense, 
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interpret, and shape social reality.”70 This “new propaganda” consists largely of online 
information influence operations in the form of mis- or disinformation emerging from 
both politically and financially motivated actors. Constantly emerging and evolving 
digital media platforms have influenced the form and function of disinformation in the 
21st century and have led to an increasingly democratized and decentralized propaganda 
machine, effecting its creation and dissemination at all levels. The nature of this system is 
instrumental in the formation of so-called Russian hybrid warfare. 
MODERN HYBRID WARFARE, SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES, AND DISINFORMATION 
Russian hybrid warfare has dominated international discourse and academic study 
of Russia’s role on the world stage since 2014, following the Russian invasion of Crimea 
and increasing notoriety of Russian information operations in Ukraine.71 Today, the 
resurgence of modern political warfare in the Russian toolkit should be understood as a 
legacy and direct continuation these Imperial Era operations and Soviet active measures 
(активные мероприятия). Soviet active measures included actions designed to “deceive 
the target (foreign governmental and non-governmental elites or mass audiences), and to 
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distort the target’s perceptions of reality to affect decisions that serve Soviet interests.”72 
Historically, active measures were both covert and overt and included:  
• Maskirovka – military deception in its totality;  
• Provokatsiya – the use of provocations; 
• Proniknoveniye – penetration;  
• Fabrikatsiya – fabrication and forced documents;  
• Agent vliyaniya – agents of influence;  
• Konspiratsiya – clandestine work;  
•  Dezinformatsiya – disinformation;  
• Mokryye delo – “wet jobs” such as assassinations, eliminations, and 
kidnappings;  
• Kombinatsiya – a combination of operative methods to achieve a given 
objective.  
 
According to Thomas Rid, “active measures are contradictory: they are covert operations 
designed to achieve overt influence, secret devices deployed in public debates, carefully 
hidden yet visible in plain sight.”73 Active measures were not “spontaneous lies by 
politicians,” but the “methodical output of large bureaucracies.”74 They were designed to 
produce a specific result, often the weakening of an adversary by stoking existing 
divisions within their society, worsening ethnic strife, or undermining trust in institutions 
among a specific subset of a population.75 Active measures, especially in the form of 
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disinformation, can be designed to fulfill a broad range of objectives, from a single, 
narrow and specific political objective to a broad campaign meant to slowly erode the 
legitimacy of a government in the eyes of its people.  
Similarly, the more modern term ‘hybrid warfare’ combines both kinetic and non-
kinetic activities, ranging from traditional covert action such as propaganda, information 
influence activities, political and economic activities, and sabotage, to paramilitary and 
military intervention.76 Hybrid threats present the “perfect conundrum” because they are 
designed to appear as a “random sequence of improvisations,” when in fact they are quite 
strategic in nature.77 Hybrid tactics can indeed be opportunistic in nature and can appear 
to be one-off events; however, Russian hybrid tactics are actually part of a larger foreign 
policy and geopolitical strategy.78 Hybrid warfare tactics are meant to target a wide range 
vulnerabilities across society in non-traditional ways, exploiting ambiguity, creativity, 
and conventional definitions of warfare in order to avoid detection and response 
thresholds.79 
The West’s understanding of hybrid tactics is defined by the so-called Gerasimov 
Doctrine. This doctrine emerged after General Valery Gerasimov published an article in 
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1999 titled “The Value of Science is in the Foresight” in the relatively obscure Russian 
journal Military-Industrial Kurier.80 Gerasimov described a theory of total and constant 
war, a “new, whole-of-government-style of warfare—one that transcends boundaries 
between peace- and wartime, best described as a fusion of various elements of soft and 
hard power across various domains.”81 Since this publication, Western policymakers and 
academics have classified hybrid warfare as a “distinct, special form of warfare… 
reinforc[ing] the perception that Russian foreign policy is entering a new chapter of bold 
and risky adventurism, guided by the Gerasimov doctrine.”82 However, this 
understanding is not sufficient. The Gerasimov Doctrine is a strategy and “operational 
concept,” rather than the “driver of Russian foreign policy.”83 The actual driving ideology 
of the Russian military stems from the Primakov Doctrine, named after former foreign 
and prime minister Yevgeny Primakov. This worldview strives for a truly multipolar 
world in which Russia is viewed as a major power rather than a unipolar world 
dominated by the United States. The Primakov Doctrine calls for resistance to NATO and 
Western expansion, while advocating Eurasian integration, and Russian dominance in the 
post-Soviet space.84 Hybrid warfare, as defined by the Gerasimov Doctrine, is simply a 
means to this end.  
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Although the vocabulary of hybrid warfare has been adopted widely by 
governmental and international organizations, academics and policymakers have debated 
the meaning of the term. Some, such as Christopher Paul, argue that concepts such as 
‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘gray zone’ warfare are simultaneously too “insufficiently distinct… 
covering too many situations that are too different,” and as highlighting differences that 
are not actually significant.85 It is true that hybrid warfare seems like an impossibly broad 
term, but when considered as a legacy of active measures, it becomes a bit clearer. As 
described above, Soviet active measures were extremely broad in their instrumentation, 
and hybrid warfare is a revitalization of those very operational tactics. In our increasingly 
digital age, one kind of active measure is particularly useful as a field equalizer due to its 
relatively cheap yet effective and plausibly deniable nature: disinformation.   
According to Bitman, disinformation is a “carefully construed false message 
leaked into an opponent’s communication system to deceive the decision-making elite or 
the public.”86 To be successful, he argues, “every disinformation message must at least 
partially correspond to reality or generally accepted views.”87 Disinformation is a 
purposeful and strategic attempt to advance a certain policy goal in a covert or plausibly 
deniable manner. It is often designed to appeal to human emotions in order to achieve 
influence and persuasion.  
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In the emerging field of disinformation studies, there are three distinct categories 
of academic scholarship. According to Golovchenko, Hartmann, and Adler-Nissen 
(2018), the first centers upon strategic narratives and disinformation discourses 
developed propagandists. The second category of academic scholarship focuses on the 
specific techniques used by the propagandists and their allies to spread disinformation: 
bots, botnets, trolls, hacking and smear campaigns, forgeries, etc. The third category, 
including Golovchenko, Hartmann, and Adler-Nissen, focuses on the role of citizens in 
the spread of disinformation and misinformation online.88 While these schools of thought 
often overlap, my research best fits within the analysis of strategic narratives utilized by 
propagandists. In this thesis, I will focus on narratives utilized by the Kremlin and 
Kremlin allies. In addition, I analyze the cognitive and emotional foundations behind a 
particular kind of narratives spread among citizens. By focusing on this aspect, this 
research seeks to better allow policymakers and security practitioners to recognize and 
address narratives that could be most potent and effective in spurring behavioral or 
cognitive change in a targeted population. 
HEURISTICS AND COGNITIVE BIASES 
Although most forms of propaganda, and disinformation in particular, exploit 
biases and shortcomings in human cognition, sexuality and gender-based narratives rely 
extensively on heuristics because the content is so emotionally charged and connected to 
ideas of culture, religion, and family. Sexuality and gender-based narratives are a useful 
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cognitive tool for the Kremlin in its attempt to increase anti-Western sentiment and 
legitimize the Kremlin’s specific worldview. These narratives are cognitive munitions 
which seek to change perception and cognition and modify behavior of targeted 
populations by exploiting heuristics, the cognitive shortcuts and problem-solving 
strategies that streamline human decision-making. Heuristics, however, create “blind 
spots” in the ways that human respond to information encountered, especially if that 
information has negative content or consequences.89 Cognitive biases, then, are “mental 
errors” caused by heuristics, “our simplified information processing strategies.”90 
Inherently, human cognition has fundamental errors that are ripe for exploitation by 
propagandists. Sexuality and gender-based narratives in disinformation are prime 
examples of the way that emotional content, inciting fear, anger, disgust, etc., can limit 
targeted population’s ability to think critically about the information they encounter. Just 
a few of the cognitive biases that the Kremlin utilizes in information operations includes 
anchoring, priming, and selective perception (for a full list, see Figure 1).91  
 
89 Judith Rosenbaum and Jennifer Bonnet, “Looking inward in an era of ‘fake news:’ Addressing cognitive 
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91 Wikimedia, “Cognitive Biases Codex,” 
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Figure 1: Cognitive Bias Codex 
 
Anchoring is a cognitive bias where an individual relies on one piece of initial 
information to make decisions. Sexuality and gender-based narratives in disinformation 
rely heavily on this cognitive cue. With anchoring bias, the first piece of news we read 
about an event serves as an ‘anchor’ with which we judge other pieces of information we 
 34 
encounter.92 People tend to consider the first piece of information they receive as the 
most reliable. Therefore, propagandists work hard to ensure that their false or misleading 
information is the first information encountered, and that it is so emotionally charged, 
that it guides the audiences thinking about the next information encountered. Sexuality 
and gender-based narratives thrive on emotions such as fear, anger, disgust, and hostility, 
and false headlines and stories that exploit these emotions are more likely to be shared on 
social media, amplifying the message and creating more instances for anchoring bias to 
take hold.93 Semantic priming is related to anchoring bias, but on a larger scale. Priming 
works by activating an association or memory right before another piece of information is 
introduced, influencing how someone responds to the given information. This technique, 
common in advertising, is also common in disinformation: the introduction of one 
stimulus influences how people respond to subsequent stimuli. This is a very common 
technique in sexuality and gender-based disinformation, as will be evident in further 
analysis.  
Rumor Theory and Conspiracy  
Rumors are a collective effort on behalf of a group or a subgroup to make sense of 
or explain some uncertain or ambiguous event with limited information. This thesis 
primarily utilizes the work of DiFonzo and Bordia, who define rumors as “unverified and 
instrumentally relevant information statements in circulation that arise in contexts of 
 
92 Kahneman, Thinking Fast, and Slow.  
93 Lars Kai Hansen, et al., “Good Friends, Bad News – Affect and Virality in Twitter” Future Information 
Technology 185 (2011).  
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ambiguity, anger, or potential threat and that function to help people make sense and 
manage risk.”94 This definition focuses on the contexts in which rumors flourish and the 
content of rumor statements. According to most basic rumor theory, there are three core 
motivations that drive people to rumor discussions: 1) rumors allow people to cope with 
uncertain and threatening circumstances; 2) rumors allow people to build relationships 
with others in their group; and 3) rumors can assist in self-enhancement, creative positive 
emotions in individuals or groups about themselves.95 According to DiFonzo & Bodia, 
the first motivation, to give explanation and bring sense to uncertain, ambiguous, or 
potentially threatening events, has traditionally been believed to be the most common 
function of rumors.  
According to this understanding, rumors arise when there is an information gap or 
ambiguity where the meaning or significance of an event is unclear. According to 
sociologist Tomotsu Shibutani (1966), when “formal information is absent, people 
compensate by informally interpreting the situation,” in order to fulfill a basic human 
core motivation: to make sense and understand.96 Rosnow (1974) and DiFonzo & Bordia 
(1998) describe the significance of the group in crafting informal understanding through 
rumor. According to Rosnow, “rumor discussion is a process of group interpretation, 
 
94 Nicholas DiFonzo and Prashant Bordia, Rumor Psychology: Social and Organizational Approaches 
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[and] rumor is a product of that process.”97 Although norms for verification of rumors 
and their sources are typically more relaxed, the information must still “pass some group 
norm of plausibility.”98 When group standards of plausibility are high, rumor discussions 
function more like fact finding. When group standards of plausibility are low, rumor 
discussions appear more like panic.99 As DiFonzo and Bordia state, though “rumor may 
also fulfill other functions such as entertainment, wish fulfillment, alliance making and 
maintenance, and enforcement of communal norms, these are secondary.”100 
Much of the traditional literature on rumor dissemination has focused on the 
“fact-finding motivation” that stems from uncertainty or ambiguity.101 This traditional 
research on rumors neglects an important subtype of rumors: those that are meant to 
increase social uncertainty. These kinds of rumors are especially common in the 
disinformation cases found in my sample of pro-Kremlin and Kremlin-sponsored 
disinformation campaigns that target Western audiences. This kind of rumor will be 
discussed at length in this analysis because rumors that are designed to induce confusion 
or chaos are often characterized by sexual violence, cultural decay, and other fear-based 
narratives. Furthermore, traditional definitions of rumor put natural community 
transmission at the center, defining rumor most often as a natural phenomenon that 
occurs when people are searching for answers among ambiguity. In contrast, 
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disinformation is often the purposeful implantation of rumor into a population. This 
means that not all rumors are natural and spontaneous in their creation. However, the 
conventional definition of rumor and rumor theory are still applicable to rumors created 
by propagandists because planted information is still adapted on a local level and 
disinformation spreads in a similar way to rumors: through information cascades.102 
Information cascades occur when a group of ‘early believers,’ often called bellwethers, 
believe something that influences others to follow suit. Rumors typically spread because 
people tend to believe what those around them believe. Today, these cascades are best 
seen on social media, especially as platform algorithms increase polarization of content 
on feeds.103 
Also significant to this study is the “crisis rumor,” which is endemic in situations 
in which there is a dearth of or ambiguity about information about an important topic.104 
The Kremlin’s propaganda machine aims to create a sense of constant crisis among both 
foreign and domestic populations, creating in effect a culture ripe for crisis rumors that 
can be exploited for political gain. Timothy Snyder coins this a “politics of eternity,” 
where Russian leadership has placed the country at the “center of a circle of eternal 
victimhood” through a “continuous sense of crisis.”105 This kind of identity of crisis often 
gives rise to conspiratorial thinking. De Benoist suggests that “conspiracy theories arise 
from human aversion to uncertainty,” so if “everything can be explained as the outcome 
 
102 Cass Sunstein, Risk and Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
103 Ibid. 
104 DiFonzo and Bordia, Rumor Psychology, 36. 
105 Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, and America (New York: Crown 
Publishing Company, 2018).  
 38 
of the human desires of powerful actors, then this leaves less of a role for random, 
unpredictable change.”106 Fenster argues that conspiracy theory “operates broadly as a 
political and cultural practice that longs for a perfectly transparent, accessible 
democracy.”107 Conspiracy theory “preys on believers’ weakness, including their 
excessive distrust or cynicism about powerful institutions.”108 Fenster, as well as Jesse 
Walker, argue that conspiracy theories are not necessarily the insidious force that they are 
oft portrayed as. Rather, they are “an integral aspect of American, and perhaps modern 
and postmodern, life.”109 This diverges from the traditional view, most known from 
Richard Hofstadter’s the “paranoid style in American politics,” which has dominated 
academic discourse for decades. Hofstadter’s article states that the “paranoid style” “is 
the preferred style only of minority movements.”110 
Conspiracy theories are often an integral feature of disinformation campaigns, 
though they require a more thorough analysis. Conspiracy theories are a larger 
construction, with detailed, fabricated plans, rather than a one-off false news story. 
Conspiracy theories are integral to understanding global populist movements and populist 
leaders on the far-right, as contemporary movements in the West that are aligned with and 
find support from the Kremlin. The Russian state has a long history of exploiting 
conspiratorial thinking as a political tool, and Putin’s Russia is no exception. The legacies 
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of Imperial and Soviet Russia, where “constant purges of enemies and spy battles – both 
real and fictional” – were part of everyday life, have contributed to the spread of 
conspiracy fears among the general population.111 The “pervasive image of an internal, 
conspiring enemy” has had a deep effect on Russian national identity that is evident in 
common assumptions today that negative socio-economic or political events are the result 
of conspiracy.112 As Ilya Yablokov argues, “two hundred years of conspiracy mythmaking 
have been decisive in shaping the notion that the West is the ultimate Enemy. The 
emergence and proliferation of anti-Western attitudes in the Post-Soviet Era have, then, a 
solid and well-developed foundation.”113  
In modern Russia, Aleksander Dugin has become a critical source of anti-Western 
conspiratorial thinking. He contends that Russia is the “Christian country which will save 
the world from Apocalypse” and the “axis of Eurasian civilization.”114 However, he has 
also been instrumental in the creation of a concept of an undifferentiated West – the 
Anglo-Saxon, Western world as a collective entity that attempts to create a New World 
Order at the expense of Russia.115 The notion of the collective West as a “conspiring 
other” has been instrumental in Russian state-making since the mid-2000s, and the 
gender-discourse emerging from the Kremlin has been a key feature of the Kremlin’s 
attempt to legitimize heavy-handed rule and the idea of “sovereign democracy.”116 
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Defined by Vladislav Surkov, “sovereign democracy” became a one of the central 
“discursive instruments invented by the Kremlin to insulate Russian from 
democratization and to facilitate an authoritarian backlash in the 2000s.”117 However, the 
conception of the idea of ‘sovereign democracy’ also came to depend on the Kremlin’s 
creation an weaponization of ‘gender ideology,’ especially as Putin has begun to 
increasingly emphasize Russia’s role as the protector of ‘traditional values,’ family, and 
Christianity. Of course, “the tendency to define a country’s place in the contemporary 
world by counter-posing gender norms” is not unique to Russia; however, Putin’s Russia 
has become known for the promotion of a “particularly sexualized form of nationalism” 
in which Russian leadership has “used a norms- and values-based argument” to frame the 
imposition of foreign ‘gender ideologies’ into the country by conspiring others. 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis  
 The analysis in this thesis is primarily conducted through a narrative discourse 
lens, utilizing the framework set out in Narrative Landmines: Rumors, Islamic 
Extremism, and the Struggle for Strategic Influence, by Bernardi et al. (2012). By 
utilizing narrative theory, each publication that is marred by disinformation can be treated 
as “micro-story” that can be sorted into “rumor families” and “rumor mosaics.” Rumor 
families are clusters of disinformation micro-stories that share a common subject or focus 
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and can be traced to a common antecedent.”118 Rumors mosaics are clusters of 
“complementary” pieces of disinformation that “collectively and collaboratively reinforce 
a common narrative.”119 Some aspects of rumor mosaics may explicitly or implicitly 
vertically integrate with common metanarratives. This vertical integration, defined by 
Betz as “vertical narrative coherence,” “rests largely on the ability to link narratives 
across a vertical spectrum from the cultural eschatological at the top to the local or 
individual at the bottom.”120 The “quality and persuasiveness” of a disinformation micro-
story “inheres from being able to logically connect” through a series of narratives 
vertically.121 These vertically aligned narratives then produce a metanarrative, which are 
deeply embedded broad ‘truths’ that typify a set of cultural beliefs. Examples of common 
metanarratives in the Russian discourse space include: 
• Moscow as the Third Rome, which defines a unique “messianic role” for 
Russia in world history.122 
• Russia as a ‘besieged fortress,’ under constant threat from outside enemies 
that are determined to use Russia as a scapegoat in the event of world crisis, 
creating a constant sense of crisis among citizens and an identity of eternal 
victimhood.123 
• Russia as the center of the Slavic universe. 
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• Russia as the torchbearer of a particular brand of non-Western enlightenment 
and social progress, a merging of both Soviet and Imperial Russian imagery. 
• The collective West as a conspiratorial and insidious “Other,” that depicts the 
West as a collective entity that is ambiguously conspiring to “undermine the 
progress of the Russian nation towards its glorious future.” This narrative has 
been used to facilitate social cohesion and oppress opposition domestically.124  
• The Kremlin as a global underdog, positioning according to the ideas of 
populist theory of power. 
• The uniqueness of Russia and of the Russian soul (русская душа), with a 
unique destiny to bridge Europe and Asia. 
 
Utilizing this narrative framework, I will critically interpret the disinformation 
micro-stories that make up my sample. In the sample, I detected seven metanarratives 
defined by 25 narratives that vertically integrate to convey one singular message: that the 
West is a decaying power that has become ripe with immorality and sexual deviance 
because of its straying from traditional, conservative values defined by the worldview of 
the Kremlin. The stories in my sample range from targeting LGBTQ+ individuals in 
Western Europe, to NATO soldiers in Lithuania, to migrants from the Middle East in 
Europe. However, all of these seemingly unrelated stories vertically integrate to support 
the same worldview. 
 
124 Yablokov, Fortress Russia. 
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 The disinformation micro-stories in my sample are diverse and open-ended, and 
the five theoretical underpinnings I will utilize in this analysis are necessary for gaining 
adequate understanding of this complex phenomenon. The sample gathered for this 
analysis contains stories that are simple examples of disinformation to broad conspiracy 
theories and everything in between, requiring an understanding of the history of Soviet 
active measures, propaganda and disinformation, and classical rumor theory. The content 
of the stories I have collected require a deep understanding of gender discourse and 
political masculinity in Russia under Vladimir Putin, and the framework applied to the 
sample for analysis leans on narrative theory and critical discourse analysis.  
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METHODS 
 This thesis primarily utilizes narrative theory derived from Bernardi et al.’s 
Narrative Landmines to answer three questions: 1) What is the role and functionality of 
sexuality and gender-based narratives within the larger body of contemporary pro-
Russian and Russian disinformation from 2015-2019?; 2) What are the intended effects 
of targeted demographics’ consumption of sexuality and gender-based narratives?; 3) Are 
the stories contained in these narratives heterogeneous or do they comply with a common 
prototype?  
To analyze Russian and pro-Russian disinformation that focuses on sexuality and 
gender-based narratives, from 2015 to present, I utilized the EU vs. Disinfo database, a 
project managed by the European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force.125 
The project was established in 2015 to “better forecast, address, and respond to the 
Russian Federation’s ongoing disinformation campaigns affecting the European Union, 
its Member States, and countries in the shared neighborhood.”126 EU vs. Disinfo’s core 
objective is to increase public awareness and understanding of the Kremlin’s 
disinformation operations in order to help European citizens develop societal resilience 
 
125 Although I relied on the EU vs. Disinfo database, I have several misgivings regarding the means of 
collection, classification, and disproval process of stories included in the database. In particular, too many 
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independence. I tried my best to avoid including opinion pieces in the sample I collected from the database. 
Despite these critiques, the EU vs. Disinfo database is the most accessible and user-friendly database of 
already proven disinformation.  
126 EU vs. Disinfo, “About,” https://euvsdisinfo.eu/about/ 
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against disinformation and media manipulation.127 To date, the database houses 8,820 
disinformation cases in 31 languages, as well as disproofs for each story, similar to fact-
checking.  
 Because the sample for this analysis came from already disproven stories in the 
EU vs. Disinfo database, disproving the information was not an aspect of this thesis. In 
order to find cases useful for this analysis, I conducted keyword searches within the EU 
vs. Disinfo database for stories published from January 2015 to March 2020. Keywords 
used include: 
• European values 
• Moral decay/moral decline 
• Gayropa 
• Western values 
• Family values 
• EU disintegration 
• Chaos 
• Anglo-saxon 
• Christianity/Christian values  
• Migrant 
• Sexual assault/sexual violence 
• Semi-men 
• LGBT 
 
Because of the relatively niche content matter and the design of the disinformation micro-
stories in my sample, the geographic scope of this thesis is broad.  
 This thesis then presents a two-fold task. First, I operationalize the concepts in the 
disinformation micro-stories contained in my sample by conducting a quantitative 
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analysis of certain characteristics in the sample. This coding schema includes the 
following elements:  
• Date of Publication 
• Metanarrative detected  
• Narrative detected  
• Primary Motivation 
• Secondary Motivation 
• Target Audience 
• Language 
• Primary Institutional-Level Target  
• Secondary Institutional-Level Target 
• Primary Country-Level Target 
• Secondary Country-Level Target 
• Primary Individual Target 
• Secondary Individual Target 
• Source of Authority 
Second, I analyze the actual content of the narratives in my sample with the five 
theoretical frameworks described above. In order to better understand the content of the 
stories in my sample, I deconstructed each to a few characteristics to sort them into 7 
metanarratives and 25 narratives based on the model presented by Bernardi et al. The 7 
metanarratives and corresponding 25 narratives detected in the sample include:  
1) Western perversion of traditional morals and resulting collapse  
o Collapse of traditional values in the West  
o Abandonment of Christianity in the West  
o Extreme sexual deviance in the West 
o Extreme adolescent empowerment  
o The disintegration of the family unit in the West 
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2) Disintegration of Traditional Gender Roles in the West 
o The rise of “semi-men” in Europe 
o Rising imperial “gay dictatorship” in Europe 
o There exist no gender differences in the West 
o Women are masculinized in the West 
o Dictatorial feminism 
3) Western subversion via “gender-based ideology”  
o Homosexuality is forced by Western on the Russian sphere of influence  
o Weaponization of “gender-based ideology” by non-governmental 
organizations and philanthropic individuals 
o Weaponization of “gender-based ideology” by governmental institutions  
o Legal enforcement of “gender-based ideology” by international 
institutions  
o Western & LGBTQ+ plus funding of pro-Western opposition groups in 
Russia and Eastern Europe 
4) Sexual predation by an ‘Other’ 
o Muslim men as perpetrators of sexual violence in the EU  
o Ukrainian men as perpetrators of sexual violence  
o NATO servicemembers are perpetrators of sexual violence  
o Jewish men as perpetrators of sexual violence  
5) Complicity of western elites, media, and judicial systems 
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o Impunity in western judicial systems for sexual and gender-based violence 
committed by Muslim men 
o Willful Western media blindness to sexual and gender-based violence 
committed by Muslim men 
o Western elites and governments disregard sexual and gender-based 
violence committed by Muslim men 
6) Extreme tolerance in the West 
o Extreme levels of tolerance in the West as a result of a skewed 
understanding of reality  
7) Russia as the savior of traditional Christendom 
o Russia as the savior of traditional, Christian values as Europe flails  
Although these categories are non-exhaustive and relatively subjective, there are 
characteristics of each that separate them from another. These categories are explained in 
detail in the next section.  
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DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF SEXUALITY AND GENDER-
BASED NARRATIVES: 
 
In the disinformation I analyzed, seven metanarratives emerged as the themes 
most prevalent in the sample. These seven metanarratives can be categorized into two 
even broader themes. The first contains the stories that allege a collapse of traditional 
religious, family, and gender values in the West. This theme contains four 
metanarratives: 1) Western perversion of traditional morals and resulting collapse; 2) 
disintegration of traditional gender roles in the West; and 3) Western subversion via 
“gender-based ideologies,” and 4) Russia as the savior of traditional Christendom. The 
second major theme is centered upon alleged sexual violence in European countries and 
the reactions of those states’ governments, media, police, judiciary, and citizens. This 
theme contains three metanarratives: 1) Sexual predation by an ‘Other;’ 2) Complicity of 
Western elites, media, and judiciary; and 3) Radical tolerance in the West. Western 
perversion of traditional morals & resulting collapse 
1. Western perversion of traditional morals and resulting collapse 
2. Disintegration of traditional gender norms in the West 
3. Sexual predation by an ‘Other’ 
4. Complicity of Western elites, media, and judicial systems 
5. Extreme tolerance in the West 
6. Russia as the savior of traditional Christendom  
 
This list of metanarratives is not exhaustive, and each metanarrative contains 
several rumor families that describe similar events or events with the same antecedent. 
However, they can fit into different rumor mosaics depending on the focus of the story. 
 50 
Each narrative vertically integrates to support one another, meaning that their boundaries 
are somewhat fluid.  
However, each metanarrative is distinct and is defined by certain characteristics that are 
described below. All of the metanarratives are meant to convey an ultimate message: that 
the West, led by the EU and Western military institutions, brings moral perversion in the 
form of violence and sexual vices to populations that embrace the principles of 
liberalism, tolerance, and multiculturalism.  
 
Western Perversion of Traditional Morals and Resulting Collapse: 
 
This metanarrative centers around these depictions of purportedly declining 
European societies due to an abandonment of traditional cultural and religious orders. 
Accusations of sexual deviancy, a rejection of the family unit, an overall decline of 
morality, and an overall Western “decadence” are the most common characteristics in 
stories that fall into this narrative family. In 2013, Putin spoke at the Valdai Discussion 
Club, a forum that “aims to promote dialogue of Russian and international intellectual 
elites” as an alternative to Western platforms, stating that “the Euro-Atlantic countries 
were rejecting their roots, including that Christian values that constitute the basis of 
Western civilization.”128 Consistent with this message, disinformation stories from this 
metanarrative range from the broad accusations of an abandonment of traditional values 
 
128 Peter Rutland, “The Pussy Riot Affair: Gender and National Identity in Putin’s Russia.” Nationalities 
Papers 42, no. 4 (July 2014).; Article 7  
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and of decay in morality,129 to allegations of sexual deviancy, with descriptions of the 
legalization of bestiality and pedophilia, as well as hypersexualization in the West.130 In 
addition, there are descriptions of the material decadence of the West, including 
descriptions of Westerners as “worshipping money,” “amorphous consumers,” and as a 
“cult of freedom at any cost.”131 Finally, this metanarrative contains stories that focus on 
the abandonment of Christianity in Europe. Prevalent in this metanarrative are stories that 
focus on the West’s, and especially of the European Union’s, “abandonment of 
Christianity.”132 These kinds of stories include rumors of marginalization of Christians in 
European Union policy,133 a genocide of Christians in Europe,134 and conspiracy theories 
about Europe’s increasing distance from Christianity causing the fire at Notre Dame.135  
Depictions of Western Europe as morally decadent or sexually deviant are not 
new to modern Kremlin-sponsored disinformation. Rather, these kinds of narratives have 
a long academic history among Slavophiles. Imagery of a “Decadent West” and moral 
superiority of the Russian cultural understanding of family and gender were popular in 
Imperial Russia as well as the Soviet Union.136  
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Disintegration of Traditional Gender Norms in the West 
This metanarrative expands on the now well-known “gayropa” trope created and 
utilized by Russian authorities as a disparaging reference to Europe that signifies both 
“Russia’s lack of acceptance towards LGBTQ+ people and to distinguish between the 
values of East and West, particularly when it comes to the rights of sexual minorities.”137 
The term “gayropa” has been utilized as a kind of cognitive device in Russian media as a 
catchall term for the what the Kremlin sees as an abandonment of traditional gender and 
sexual norms, as well as a representation of the decline in relations between Russia and 
the West since the annexation of Crimea.138 Since Putin’s return to power in 2012, the 
gender dimension has been one of the most significant aspects of allegations directed at 
the West by the Kremlin.139  
The stories contained in this metanarrative focus on what the Kremlin’s 
worldview positions as non-traditional gender and sexual norms.  This definition expands 
on the classic understanding of ‘gayropa’ by focusing on all stories that allege a 
“feminization” of European society. A prominent theme in this metanarrative is the 
feminization, clearly used a synonym for “weakening,” of European men, who are oft 
referred to as “semi-men” in Kremlin-sponsored disinformation.140 The implication of the 
claim of “semi-men” is that European men are unable to fulfill their gender duty in 
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protecting European women from “foreign invaders,” often the imagery that the Kremlin 
utilizes when describing Muslim refugees in the EU.141 Often, the feminization of men is 
portrayed in tandem with the purported “masculinization of women” in the West.142 
Often, these stories would target “post-modern feminism” as being synonymous with the 
“destruction of men” as women “behave like men in their quest to gain total power.”143 
Alternatively, many stories allege that there are “no gender differences” in the West, as 
radical liberalism and feminism have made it “illegal” to acknowledge differences 
between genders.144 
 Additionally, this metanarrative contains stories that claim a “gay dictatorship” 
seeks world domination and that “gay fascism” is the ideology of Europe.145 Similarly, 
many stories targeted the first openly gay high-level politicians of several countries, 
including Serbia, the United States, and Luxembourg, among others, as well as female 
leaders from numerous European and Central Asian countries and the United States. 
These stories are meant to implicate the West, and especially Europe, in the 
disintegration of traditional gender norms and as engaging in dangerous transgressions of 
gender boundaries. On the other hand, Russia and state leadership are depicted as a 
bastion of real women and real men and a protector of the traditional gender order. 
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Western Subversion via ‘Gender Based Ideology’ 
As Putin embraces traditional, conservative values since his return to the 
presidency in 2012, he has also crafted a narrative that warns of the exportation of this 
liberal, Western model to Russia and the Near Abroad. With this narrative, Putin creates 
a reason for aggressively anti-Western, anti-liberal cultural growth, and positions Russia 
as constantly in danger of falling subject to this immoral order. Therefore, this narrative 
family includes descriptions of forced homosexuality by Western and international 
powers. This force occurs through both hidden subversion and legal mechanisms and 
descriptions of an enforcement of a “liberal gender order” through “radical feminism and 
gender theories” by Western powers, powerful philanthropic donors and non-
governmental organizations, and international institutions.146 
The most prominent narrative in this metanarrative is the weaponization of 
gender-based ideology by Western powers and international institutions, predominately 
the United Nations. Here, a large conspiracy theory also reigns, claiming that the world’s 
“liberal-globalist elites” are attempting to dominate the world to implement a “liberal 
gender order,” often described as being under the leadership of George Soros and the 
Clintons.147 According to the Kremlin and its allies, Western powers attempt coups and 
bring down governments by weaponizing “gender ideologies” and feminism in countries 
that are not aligned with the liberal West.148 In my sample, this narrative was highly 
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targeted towards post-Soviet states in the South Caucasus, especially Georgia and 
Armenia. Stories alleged that the “Soros Army” sends “Soros spies” to Armenia to force 
them to ratify the Istanbul Convention, which they claimed sought to undermine Russo-
Armenian relations to force Armenia to become the “Netherlands of the South 
Caucasus.”149 In Georgia, the storyline followed that Soros and the Open Society 
Foundation meant to disrupt the “traditional gender order” in Georgia, which would 
cause an eruption of violence.150 
Stories alleging forced homosexuality in Europe, in which the European Union 
forces potential member states to “propagate” or celebrate homosexuality, were also 
common in the sample. Often, these stories center upon international institutions, such as 
NATO and the UN, forcing countries to legalize same-sex marriage before gaining 
membership. One story in the sample claimed that NATO General Secretary Jens 
Stoltenberg was going to force Georgia to recognize gay marriage in order to become a 
member of NATO.151 These stories also largely target countries in what the Russia 
considers its near abroad, backing up Kremlin interests in dissuading these countries from 
seeking membership in Western-led international institutions. Another variation of this 
story in my sample told of Belarus being punished by the EU, usually through large 
Schengen Visa fees, for not having a large enough LGBTQ+ community.152 
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Sexual Predation by an ‘Other’ 
 Stories within this metanarrative depict an ‘Other’ engaged in sexual violence, 
usually against ethnically Russian or Russian-allied women, and as purveyors of 
immorality in Europe. All of the stories in this metanarrative consist of a common 
storyline filled with familiar archetypes: a hero in the form of the Russian government, a 
villain in the form of an “Ultimate Other,” a victim in the form of an ethnically Russian 
or pro-Russian helpless woman, a non-responsive bystander, a witness, and a complicit 
police force and state apparatus. This metanarrative has four distinct narratives, classified 
by types of “Ultimate Other” that are targeted: 1) NATO troops, 2) Islamic men in the 
EU, 3) Ukrainian men, and 4) Jewish men.  
MUSLIM MIGRANTS AS THE ULTIMATE OTHER:  
 In 2015, FRONTEX registered 1.8 million refugees entering Europe and 1.3 
million applied for asylum in an EU state.153 Nearly half of those who applied for asylum 
were from three countries: Syria, Afghanistan, or Iraq. Since 2012, Germany had been 
the primary destination of those seeking asylum from the Middle East; however, 
Hungary, Sweden, and Austria had the most asylum applications per capita in 2015.154 
From 2014 to 2016, European publics grew increasingly dissatisfied with governments’ 
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handling of the ‘migrant crisis:’ the majority of people in Greece, Sweden, Italy, Spain, 
Hungary, Poland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands disapproved of their 
government’s handling of the influx of refugees.155 As unrest grew, the Kremlin 
increasingly exploited the political situation in Europe, and used the events as evidence 
that multiculturalism in Europe was failing, that accepting refugees from Muslim-
majority countries led to the collapse of ‘law and order’, that the EU was plagued by 
inefficiency and “extreme tolerance.”156 In this narrative family, the “Ultimate Other” is a 
Muslim man, often a recent refugee from the Middle East, and the witness is of Eastern 
or Central European origins living in Western Europe. This archetype is significant 
because their legitimacy is drawn from their national origins, while they maintain 
authority to discuss the West because of their place of residence.   
RT, Sputnik and Russian-aligned outlets in the West have featured numerous 
articles about the violence that has come to Europe as a result of migration. The most 
famous of these stories is that of Lisa, a 13-year-old German citizen, a girl of Russian 
descent who had claimed that she had been kidnapped and assaulted for 30 hours by three 
men of Middle Eastern origin. The story was first reported by a small website meant for 
Russian expats living in Germany. Soon, a journalist from Channel 1 in Russia picked the 
story up, amplifying it to a broader European audience as more mainstream media 
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platforms took the story.157 Using data from her cell phone, the German authorities were 
able to determine that she had been at a 19-year-old male’s house.158 The incident 
triggered tension between Russian and German authorities. Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov claiming that the case had been covered up by the German authorities, 
adding that he hoped that “migration problems” would not “drive authorities to ‘paint 
over reality with political correctness.’”159 
Additionally, the 2015-2016 New Year’s Eve attacks in Cologne, Germany are 
central to this narrative. The Cologne attacks are a prime example of one of the Kremlin’s 
most utilized disinformation tactics: manipulation of truth. On December 31, 2015, large-
scale sexual assaults and burglaries were reported in several German towns. Over 1,200 
criminal charges were made, approximately 500 of which pertained to sexual assault.160 
In this case, the Kremlin degraded the poignancy of the attacks that did occur and 
contributed to the lack of an appropriate response by dramatizing the events, perpetuating 
false narratives about subsequent sexual violence by Muslim men or the legal protection 
of attackers by European governments for years to come, and creating a kind of 
“censorship through noise.”161 Russian media refers to the Cologne Attacks as the “Night 
of Long Arms,” comparing it to Kristallnacht as a coordinated, extreme violence on a 
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massive scale, with widespread inability or unwillingness of police and policymakers to 
stop the attacks.162 Following the 2015-2016 NYE attacks, Russian and pro-Russian 
outlets have published stories that claim there to be high levels of sexual violence in EU 
member states, especially in Germany and Sweden, greatly overestimating those 
numbers.163  
WESTERN SOLDIERS AS THE ULTIMATE OTHER:  
 The stories in this narrative family are nearly the same in substance and function 
as the stories of alleged sexual assault by Muslim migrants in Europe; however, the 
“Ultimate Other” in this case is a NATO soldier. Often, the soldier in these stories is 
Western European and the place of the attack is a former Soviet Republic or Eastern Bloc 
country. One example comes from Lithuania, where a story emerged that alleged that a 
German member of the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence stationed in Rukla had 
assaulted an underage Lithuanian girl.164 Another is set in Ukraine, where Lithuanian 
NATO soldiers were accused of assaulting underage Ukrainian girls.165 In these stories, 
the implication is that if you are a member of NATO and have soldiers stationed on the 
ground, they bring violence and moral degradation. In another example, American NATO 
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soldiers were rumored to be involved in a sex trafficking ring in the Romanian towns of 
Caracal and Deveselu.166  
  
Complicity of Western Elites, Media, and Judicial Systems  
 This metanarrative alleges that Western elites, media, and judicial systems are 
unwilling or unable to address sexual and gender-based violence in Europe when those 
crimes are committed by a Muslim man, especially with refugee status. It contains stories 
that range from alleged judicial reform in Western Europe, to leaders who refuse to 
denounce sexual or gender-based violence if the perpetrators are immigrants, to Western 
media that actively covers up and refuses to report on sexual violence in Europe. These 
narratives primarily target Germany and Sweden, as well as the European Union as an 
institution. The most prevalent storyline in this metanarrative alleges legal impunity for 
Muslim men who commit sexual violence in Europe. This focus attempts to implicate 
Western governments and individual leaders, especially German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, in the crimes themselves and to allege that liberal governments are unwilling to 
protect their own citizens. One story in the sample claimed that “not a single criminal 
case has been opened in Germany” for more than 500 sexual assault cases perpetrated by 
refugees.167 In a similar vein, another story claimed that the “Feminist Government of 
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Sweden” ordered police not to investigate sexual violence when the attack was 
committed by a refugee.168 
In addition, this metanarrative contains rumors that protests against sexual 
violence were shut down in Germany, alleging a crackdown on free speech and a national 
cover-up of sexual and gender-based violence in the country.169 Finally, another storyline 
consisted of tales of false judicial reform that was meant to protect perpetrators of sexual 
violence. In one such story, it was claimed that a new law was passed in Germany that 
made it illegal to prosecute someone of sexual assault if they were a refugee. In fact, after 
the 2015-2016 NYE Cologne Attacks, the German Parliament passed a stricter sexual 
assault law.170  
Radical Tolerance in the West 
 This narrative family contains stories that allege that European society and 
governments are so “radically tolerant” that they allow failed multiculturalism and 
violence to destroy their countries. In his annual address on December 12, 2013, Vladimir 
Putin “lambasted ‘so-called tolerance’ as ‘sexless and infertile’ and fundamentally 
unnecessary for Russia with its great history and culture.”171 He finished by advocating 
an adherence to conservative values as a defense against “moving backward and down 
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toward chaotic darkness.”172 This metanarrative is defined by a focus on so-called 
“radical tolerance” in the West, often portrayed as leading to a collapse due to the 
inefficacy of multiculturalism. Clearly, this serves as a defense for the Kremlin to not 
adhere to a goal of liberal multiculturalism. In many of the stories in this metanarrative, 
the sexual assault and other violence in Europe is blamed on the West’s misguided 
embrace of “tolerance.” 
With headlines such as “Tolerant Sweden Fed Up with Migrants,” several rumors 
in our sample described the way that radical tolerance has caused European countries, 
most commonly targeting Scandinavian countries and Germany, to accept sexual 
violence, despite the grievances from their citizens.173 Similarly, one of the most striking 
storylines in this metanarrative alleged that victims of sexual assault in Europe are forced 
to apologize to their assailants. The “Forgive Me Flash Mob” was described in my 
sample several times, in which European women are forced to “repent” to their rapist, 
apologizing for their “depraved behavior and clothes” that “forced” the migrant men to 
assault them.174 The message of this rumor is two-fold. First, that the EU has become so 
‘tolerant’ that it has begun to embrace sexually deviant illegal behaviors as normal and 
welcomes those that are immoral and violence as a result. Second, this rumor targets 
European women as a form of victim-blaming, insinuating that their embrace of 
liberalism led to hyper-sexualization and deviance that can be blamed for their assault. 
 
172 Eksi and Wood, “Ring wing populism as gendered performance,” 743. 
173 Article 42. 
174Article 43  
 63 
Other rumors in our sample describe European men as “emasculated...by cultural codes 
of tolerance, political correctness, and compulsory kindness.”175 
Other stories in this sample took another direction with a criticism of ‘radical 
tolerance,’ claiming that European states had become so concerned about violence 
against women that they have passed laws requiring all parties to sign a “contract of 
consent” before engaging in any sort of sexual activity or the man could be charged with 
assault.176 Additionally, other stories claim that it is illegal for men to “even think about 
women” in Europe, as heterosexual white men have become “villains” in the West.177 
 
Russia as the Savior of Traditional Christendom and “True Europe” 
In his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2013, Putin “went ‘global’ with 
his moral agenda,” criticizing the West’s abandonment of morality and positioning 
Russia as a “guardian of traditional values worldwide.”178  The stories within this 
metanarrative align with this self-prescribed status for Russia as the savior of traditional 
society. This metanarrative includes stories that, while also focusing on the decaying and 
failing West, center upon a kind of messianic role of the Russian Federation under the 
rule of Vladimir Putin. Some of these narratives explicitly state that the Russian political 
and cultural system is “one to be sought,” in contrast to “dangerous Western ‘liberal 
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democracy,’ that… puts all efforts in degrading and discrediting traditional values.”179 
Another variation alleged that Russia was the “global protector of free speech” as the 
West continues to “censor” non-liberal voices. 180 Other stories described Vladimir Putin 
himself as the savior of the Russian state, as the only guard against Russia falling for the 
“trap of hedonistic liberalism.”181 The most prevalent story in this metanarrative focused 
on the image of Russia as a savior of Christendom, as the “preserve[r] of the original 
Christian spirit.”182 In this same theme, stories alleged that religious leaders from around 
the world, but mostly Slavic countries, believed Putin to be the only man who could 
defend the Christian world from the dangers that liberal modernity poses.183 
Taken together, all of these metanarratives and sub-narratives create a unified 
message: that Western governance systems, and in particular their values of 
multiculturalism and tolerance, will lead to moral perversion and deviance, especially in 
the way of sexual vices and a corruption of ‘traditional’ femininity and masculinity. The 
West presents two kids of threats: a physical one and a spiritual one. In this story, Russia, 
only under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, is the one and only savior for 
traditional Europe and Christian civilization.  
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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SEXUALITY AND GENDER-
BASED NARRATIVES: 
Frequency of Metanarratives and Sub-Narratives: 
In the sample of disinformation gathered from the EU vs. Disinfo database, 
several key findings emerged. First, the most common metanarrative was ‘Western 
perversion of traditional morals,’ which is consistent with the Kremlin’s overall 
worldview and geopolitical goals (See Figure 2). While some of the most shocking 
stories in my sample contained graphic descriptions of sexual assault, those stories 
remained something of a supportive side-story to these broader metanarratives that seek 
to undermine Western legitimacy. We can also see this trend in the frequency of the sub-
narratives. Four of the five most common narratives are broad in scope, targeting the 
entire collective West as hosts and exporters of immorality. Two of these, “collapse of 
traditional values” and “abandonment of Christianity,” fit into the ‘Western perversion of 
traditional morals metanarrative. The other two, “weaponization of ‘gender-based 
ideology by Western Governmental Institutions and “legal enforcement of ‘gender-based 
ideology by international institutions” fit into the “Western subversion via ‘gender-based 
ideology’” metanarrative.   
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Figure 2: Frequency of Metanarratives 
 
 
 
 67 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Collapse of Traditional Values in the West
Abandonment of Christianity in the West
Weaponization of Gender-Based Ideology by Governmental Institutions
Legal Enforcement of Gender Based Ideology by International
Institutions
Muslim Men as Perpetrators of Sexual Violence in EU Member States
Extreme Levels of Tolerance in the West
Russia as the Savior of the Christian World
Extreme Sexual Deviance in the West
Extreme Adolescence Empowerment
The Disintegration of the Family Unit in the West
Impunity in Western Judicial Systems for SGBV
Weaponization of Gender-Based Ideology by Non-Governmental
Organizations and Philanthropic Individuals
Western & LGBTQ+ Funding of pro-Western Opposition Groups
Dictatorial Feminism
The Rise of the “Semi-Man” in the EU
Western Media Blindness to SGBV
Rising Imperialist “Gay Dictatorship” in Europe
Western Elites Disregard SGBV
Ukrainian Men as Perpetrators of Sexual Violence
No Gender Differences Exist in the West
Masculinization of Women in the West
Forced Homosexuality by Western Powers
NATO Servicemembers as Perpetrators of Sexual Violence
Jewish Men as Perpetrators of Sexual Violence
Frequency of Subnarratives
Figure 3: Frequency of Subnarratives 
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However, the fifth most common narrative contains stories alleging sexual 
violence in the European Union by refugees from the Middle East, mostly during the 
migrant crisis. These stories are in the “sexual predation by an “Other” metanarrative. 
That metanarrative contains four sub-narratives, each with a different ‘Other:’ refugees, 
NATO servicemembers, Ukrainian soldiers, or Jewish men. By and large, the most 
common storyline in this metanarrative alleges that refugees in Europe from the Middle 
East were perpetrators of widespread sexual violence in Western European countries, 
especially Germany and Sweden. The Russian media’s coverage of this issue is a perfect 
example of the way that disinformation functions. On New Year’s Eve 2015-2016 in 
Cologne, Germany, scores of women reported being assaulted or sexually harassed. 
Following this event, propagandists exploited the fear and anger that many people in 
Europe felt, and pushed disinformation meant to impact Europeans’ perceptions and 
beliefs regarding the acceptance of refugees from the Middle East, especially Syria and 
Afghanistan. The utilization of truth that occurs in this metanarrative is central to the 
legitimacy that the target audiences assigns the information.  
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Overall Frequency of Target Audience and Source Language 
 Overall, the most common source language was Russian, followed by Georgian 
and Italian. In accordance with this, the most targeted audience of the disinformation in 
my sample was Russian speakers. Georgian, Italian, Belarusian, and Armenian 
populations followed next. These results are as anticipated because the Kremlin’s primary 
target of disinformation is in fact their own citizens. The Kremlin and Vladimir Putin rely 
on propaganda and sexuality and gender-based disinformation narratives to build political 
legitimacy and ensure national cohesion. Georgia, Armenia, and Belarus are common 
targets because they lie in Russia’s claimed near abroad and sit at the junction of 
geopolitical tension between Russia and the West. Interestingly, Italy was the most 
commonly targeted Western European country. This is likely because of the country’s 
large devout Catholic population and conservativism, which primes the population for 
gender-based narratives. Compared to Poland, another strongly Catholic and conservative 
country, Italy would be more receptive to Russian information because of the historically 
acrimonious relationship between Poland and Russia.  
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Figure 4: Frequency of Source Language 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Ru
ssi
an
Ge
org
ian
Ita
lia
n
Cz
ec
h
En
gli
sh
Ar
me
nia
n
Hu
ng
ari
an
Po
lish
Ro
ma
nia
n
Sp
an
ish
Uk
rai
nia
n
Ge
rm
an
Bu
lga
ria
n
Ar
ab
ic
Source	Language
 71 
 
Figure 5: Frequency of Targeted National Audience 
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Primary and Secondary Targets 
Overall, the disinformation in my sample targeted the countries and institutions 
that are most expected. These targets are the subjects of the false stories and includes 
institutional-level targets and country-level targets (see Figures 6, 7, and 8). I also 
distinguished between primary targets and secondary targets. Primary targets are the 
primary subject of the disinformation, meaning the institution or country meant to be 
maligned by the included false information. Secondary targets are countries or 
institutions that were also mentioned in the false story but are more marginal in the 
storyline. The most common overall target, of primary or secondary nature, was the 
European Union, followed by a target of the collective West and liberalism more 
generally (See Figure 6). The countries most targeted were the United States, Germany, 
Sweden, Ukraine, and France.  
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The most common secondary targets, meaning the disinformation story had 
another more primary target, were the EU, migrants from the Middle East, the US, 
Western NGOs, and Ukraine (see Figure 8). When compared to the primary targets, 
Western NGOs, Ukraine, migrants from Middle Eastern countries, and Afghanistan 
moved much higher on the list. This is telling because these secondary targets are the 
institutions or countries that are easy to throw into a story that is not actually originally 
about them. We see this in the form of a story targeting Sweden, and it’s easy and 
convenient to simultaneously mention George Soros or Western-funded NGOs. Often, 
these secondary targets are included as a kind of cognitive device that frames the way 
that the reader should view the story.  
 
Individual Targets 
 The disinformation in my sample targeted a wide range of individuals, from 
Western political leaders, to opposition leaders in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, 
leaders of the EU and NATO, Western academics, as well as cultural figures and well-
known figures in Western news and in recent years (see Figures 9 & 10). Most of the 
most targeted individuals are very expected: George Soros, Hillary Clinton, Angela 
Merkel, Pope Francis, and Jens Stoltenberg. Most leaders of Western countries are 
targeted, as well as military leaders. Most interesting though, are the targeted individuals 
who are seemingly less important and somewhat random. Most of these targets are 
LGBTQ individuals on city councils in the US, in state level governance, or in a national 
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Figure 9: Targeted Individuals 
government. Some of these examples include: Eva Brunne, the first openly gay bishop in 
the Church of Sweden, and her partner who is also a religious leader, Gunilla Lindon; 
Eric Fanning, the first openly gay Secretary of the Army in the United States; Roy 
Ashburn, an openly gay State Senator from California; and Georgina Beyer, the first 
openly transgender member of parliament in New Zealand. 
Overall, the most targeted group of individuals were national-level politicians, 
followed by public figures and cultural icons, and local-level politicians. Consistent with 
the Kremlin’s use of religion and ‘traditional values’ in these kinds of disinformation 
narratives, the only religious leader targeted was Pope Francis, considered to be a more 
‘liberal’ religious leader. Interestingly though, he is also referred to as a source of 
authority in the section below.  
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Sources of Authority Cited:  
Consistent with the Kremlin’s utilized narratives are the sources of authority that 
they cite in them. These sources of authority are politicians, public figures, religious 
leaders, and known conspiracy theorists whose words they use as a kind of validation of 
the false information contained in the disinformation stories in my sample. Most 
common, of course, were Vladimir Putin himself; Alexander Dugin, one of Putin’s 
favorite right-wing intellectuals and known conspiracy theorist; Sergei Lavrov, Foreign 
Minister of Russia; Ilia II, the leader of the Georgian Orthodox Church; Patriarch 
Neophyte, the head of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church; and Patriarch Kirill, the Patriarch 
of Moscow.  
 More national-level politicians and academics or intellectuals were cited as 
sources of authority that religious leaders, but those national-level politicians or 
academics were often cited only a few times. Religious leaders such as the leaders of 
Orthodox Churches were cited over and over as proof or validation of the claim in the 
story. This is expected when considering the content of sexuality and gender-based 
narratives, which often rely on religious arguments when claiming the immorality of the 
West and the superiority of the Russian state.  
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Figure 12: Sources of Authority Cited 
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Case Studies 
In my sample, I saw that certain primary and secondary targets were often paired 
together: Germany or Sweden and Syria or Afghanistan, the US and Ukraine, NATO and 
Ukraine, Georgia and the United Nations, or Armenia and Western funded NGOs. These 
patterns are evidence of specifically manufactured content and targeted disinformation 
for different intended audiences. The metanarratives and narratives that are locally salient 
are not going to be effective in another. As the following cases will demonstrate, 
metanarratives and narratives are often purposefully selected by propagandists in order to 
be historically and culturally resonant in a particular context. 
ARMENIA  
 When the target audience of the disinformation in my sample was Armenian, the 
frequency of narratives shifted to focus more on foreign interference through weaponized 
‘gender-based ideology’ (See Figure 13). This narrative is especially potent in the 
Armenian context, where a crisis of national identity has plagued the country since the 
Velvet Revolution in 2018. Since protests forced then prime minister Serzh Sargsyan to 
resign in favor of opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan, the Armenian system of governance 
and the media landscape have been in a transitional period. As the new government 
attempts to build legitimacy and consolidate power, conditions are ripe for foreign 
interference in the country’s political system.  
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Figure 13: Frequency of Narratives Targeting Armenian Population 
The former ruling government’s value system was based on ‘traditional values,’ 
where the “traditional family was considered the core structure of society.”184 Very often, 
this framework of traditionality was openly discriminatory and violent towards LGBTQ+ 
populations and women in Armenia. Before the Velvet Revolution, the old regime 
actively subjected its own population to “propaganda of traditional values.”185 This was 
often based in religion, as 93% of the Armenian population belong to the Armenian 
Apostolic Church.186 With the installation of the new government, foreign-sponsored 
disinformation has increased as both citizens and the regime attempt to negotiate the 
future path of the country and navigate their changing national identity.  
 
 
184 Anna Pambukhchyan, “Propaganda and Human Rights Discourse in Armenia,” EVN Report, 2018, 
https://www.evnreport.com/politics/propaganda-and-human-rights-discourse-in-armenia. 
185 Pambukhchyan, “Propaganda and Huamn Rights Discourse in Armenia.” 
186 Pambukhchyan, “Propaganda and Human Rights Discourse in Armenia.”  
 83 
In my sample, the most common narrative was the idea that gender and sexual 
minorities have been purposefully imported into the country from Western powers in the 
form of international institutions mandating gender equality, to George Soros and Open 
Society Foundation funding the importation of LGBTQ+ populations, as a way to 
destabilize the country and undermine its national security.187 By pushing social 
conservative narratives and building fear of Western interference, the Kremlin is hoping 
to stoke anti-Western, and especially anti-European Union, sentiment. These narratives 
are especially potent in the Armenian context because of the past regime’s reliance on 
rhetoric on ‘traditional values’ rhetoric to build legitimacy and national cohesion.  
GEORGIA  
Georgia is a key target for Russian information influence operations. The 2017 
report of the Georgian State Security Service describes extensive problem that the 
country faces against disinformation and information influence operations, often 
conducted by the Russian Federation. According to the Security Service, the main 
objectives are “instigating anti-western sentiments in Georgian society; undermining the 
image of Georgia as a reliable partner in the international area; establishing distrust, 
uncertainty, hopelessness, and nihilism in the public; creating destabilization… in order 
to cause disintegration processes and polarize the Georgian society.”188  The Georgian 
Government’s Communication Strategy on Georgia’s Membership to the EU and NATO 
 
187 Article 51. 
188 Kremlin Watch, “Georgia: Relations with the Russian Federation,” 2020, 
https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/countries-compared-states/georgia/. 
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for 2017-2020 also describes the extensive information operations that are actively 
targeting the country in an attempt to deter membership in the two organizations. The 
document notes that the Kremlin’s information war aims at “weakening societal 
resilience, discrediting anti-Western values, and reducing trust towards EU and 
NATO.”189 In addition, the Georgian Defense Ministry named hybrid warfare as one of 
the country’s top security challenges.  
There are two distinct threads of anti-Western disinformation targeting Georgian 
populations in my sample: anti-EU and anti-NATO. Russian information operations seek 
to influence Georgian citizens by weakening state institutions and overall levels of trust, 
discrediting Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation, and building support for pro-
Russian worldview that is inherently anti-Western. Most importantly, Kremlin sponsored 
disinformation targeting the country seeks to discredit membership in or cooperation with 
EU and NATO as a viable path for Georgia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 Ibid.  
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Figure 14: Frequency of Narratives Targeting Georgian Audience  
 
 
Because of this difficult geopolitical positioning, the most common narratives 
targeting Georgian populations are diverse. They include similar narratives to Armenia, 
warning of Western interference through gender-based ideology, to narratives that align 
with the ‘Gayropa’ trope claiming erasure of family and gender in the EU, to 
disinformation that depict NATO servicemembers as sexual predators and occupiers (see 
Figure 14).  
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Figure 15: Frequency of Narratives Targeting Italian Audience 
ITALY 
 Disinformation targeting Italy centers heavily on the ‘Gayropa’ trope, claiming a 
collapse of traditional and moral values in the West and especially the E.U., often in the 
form of erasure of traditional family and gender structures. This kind of narrative would 
be more potent in Italy than other countries because of Italy’s recent shift towards social 
conservativism and increasing Euroscepticism and popularization of far-right 
movements, as well as its largely Catholic population. According to the EU Parlometer in 
2019, Italy is in the top four countries that believe EU membership is overall negative.190 
In addition, less than 50% of Italians believe that Italy has benefitted from EU 
membership.191 
 
190 European Parliament, “Heeding the Call Beyond the Vote: A Stronger Parliament to Listen to Citizens 
Voices,” 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2019/parlemeter-2019-heeding-the-call-
beyond-the-vote/report/en-report.pdf. 
191 European Parliament, “A Stronger Voice: Citizens’ Views on Parliament and the EU,” 2017, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/external/html/parlemetre/eb88_v2.pdf.  
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Figure 16: Frequency of Narratives Targeting Czech Audience 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
 The stories from my sample that target Czech audiences revolve exclusively 
around the 2015-2016 Migrant Crisis in Europe. These narratives focused on the alleged 
ineptitude of the EU at handling the influx of migrants or the impunity that Muslim men 
were allegedly granted by European leaders, media, and judicial systems (see Figure 16). 
Germany was often portrayed as the leader of the EU’s migration policy, and Angela 
Merkel was targeted specifically by several of the disinformation stories in my sample. 
These narratives were particularly potent in the Czech Republic in the years following the 
migration crisis because of the Czech public’s and leadership’s response to the influx of 
migrants into Europe. 
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The Czech Republic, along with Hungary and Poland, was charged by the 
European Court of Justice for violating their obligations be refusing to take in their share 
of asylum seekers at the height of the crisis in 2015.192 During the migrant crisis, the 
Czech public and political leadership expressed negative attitudes towards refugees and a 
wave of Islamophobia, polarizing society and putting the country at odds with the EU. 
President Miloš Zeman and Prime Minister Andrej Babiš were both outwardly hostile to 
Islamic migrants entering the country and utilized the crisis as a political tool 
domestically. As a result, the topic of Islamic migration became a useful narrative tool for 
anti-EU and Islamophobic disinformation emerging from the Kremlin. These narratives 
would encourage both anti-migrant sentiment, furthering the chasm between the Czech 
Republic and the EU, and increase distrust in the EU among the Czech public. These 
narratives, then, served as a way for the Kremlin to undermine internal cohesion within 
the EU during and after the migrant crisis, furthering their own geopolitical aim of 
weakening the European Union by fostering internal dissent.  
RUSSIA  
Most of the stories in my sample were actually meant for consumption within a 
Russian speaking audience, often those living within the Russian Federation (See Figure 
4). The narratives targeting the Russian population were extremely diverse, representing 
the Kremlin’s multifaceted intended objectives from the weaponization of sexuality and 
gender-based disinformation narratives (see Figure 17). Narratives targeting Russian 
 
192 Matina Stevis-Gridneff and Monika Pronszuk, “E.U. Court Rules 3 Countries Violated Deal on 
Refugee Quotas,” New York Times, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/world/europe/european-
court-refugees-hungary-poland-czech-republic.html. 
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populations included depictions of the EU as abandoning traditional values and 
Christianity, relying on both themes of sexual violence and erasure of traditional gender 
and family structures. The aim of the Kremlin here is three-fold: 1) legitimize the regime 
of Vladimir Putin and the regimes adherence to an aggressive ideology of ‘traditional 
values,’ and 2) discredit Western, liberal systems as ineffective alternatives to the 
Russian system; and 3) portray Vladimir Putin as the protector and savior of both the 
Russian people and of the future of the traditional Christian world.  Because Putin utilizes 
these narratives to reinforce his own legitimacy, the narrative ‘Russia as the savior of the 
Christian world’ appeared much more frequently when targeting Russian speaking 
audiences.  
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Figure 17: Frequency of Narratives Targeting Russian Audience   
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DISCUSSION 
 The Kremlin utilizes sexuality and gender-based narratives in disinformation 
operations because of their extremely potent emotionally based content and their ability 
to reuse storylines and narratives in different cultural contexts with only minor changes. 
Sexuality and gender-based narratives are cheap and effective cognitive weapons in the 
Kremlin’s political warfare tookit that can be used against the West, the Russian domestic 
population, and to manipulate Russian aligned nations with only minor changes. From 
this analysis, it is clear that the Kremlin has a perennial cast of characters and villains, 
which can be shifted around depending on the targeted national audience. For example, in 
the Czech Republic and other EU states who resisted migration from the Middle East, the 
villain in the story becomes a Muslim man who is invading the nation both territorially 
and symbolically through the sexual assault of the nation’s women. For a Polish 
audience, the villain is often LGBTQ+ populations who have been purposefully exported 
from the West. In Armenia, the villain is Open Society Foundation and the United 
Nations, who are plotting to bring Western ‘gender ideology’ into the country to 
undermine its national security. For the Russian population, the villain is the idea of a 
collective West, who constantly seeks to undermine the Russian state through foreign 
‘gender ideology.’ This idea of a Collective West is central to this analysis, as the entirety 
of the Western World was often targeted as one force instituting ‘radical’ tolerance, 
liberalism, and multiculturalism around the world. Interestingly, the idea of the collective 
West, Europe/European Union, and the United States were often completely 
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interchangeable in a storyline in my sample because the ultimate target was liberalism 
and multiculturalism itself. 
 Another interesting finding concerns the narratives surrounding sexual and 
gender-based violence in Europe. The storyline was often nearly exactly the same: a 
young girl, often ethnically Russian was walking home from school or church, an 
outsider (Muslim man, NATO soldier stationed in the country, Jewish man, Ukrainian 
man, LGBTQ+ individual) assaulted her, some kind of trustworthy bystander witnessed 
the attack or the kidnapping and is the source of authority in the reporting, Western 
European police, media, and pollical leaders refused to do anything about the attack, 
forcing Russian leaders to protect the helpless victim. This narrative storyline is 
extremely useful for the Kremlin because they can simply exchange the identity of the 
attacker and the location of the attack, and the story appeals to an entirely new population 
in a different cultural and historical context. These storylines are effective because they 
exploit cognitive biases and basic human emotions such as fear and anger. 
 Taken together, the intended message of these narratives is clear: that Western 
governance systems, and in particular their values of multiculturalism and tolerance, will 
lead to moral perversion and deviance, especially in the way of sexual vices and a 
corruption of ‘traditional’ femininity and masculinity. In this message, Russia, only under 
the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, is the one and only savior for traditional 
Europe and Christian civilization. With this messianic image, the Kremlin is attempting 
to pose the Russian system of “sovereign democracy” as the only viable alternative, with 
its cultural and ethnic homogeneity, embrace of traditional gender roles and family unit, 
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and adherence to conservative values. In recent years, scholars have described 
authoritarian states, such as China and Russia, as attempting to create an alternative 
system to liberal democracy, often called illiberal democracy or competitive 
authoritarianism.193 In the Russian case, the goal seems to not only be to create an 
alternative political system to that in the West, but an alternative cultural and societal 
structure that is built on a specific view of traditionality, gender norms, and religion.  
The use of sexuality and gender-based narratives in Kremlin-sponsored 
disinformation is should be understood as a direct threat to the future of Western liberal 
democratic systems, especially as right-wing parties in the U.S. and Europe are 
increasingly embracing ideals that align with the Kremlin’s alternative worldview. The 
Kremlin is actively utilizing sexuality and gender-based narratives in disinformation 
operations in order to maintain and expand domestic and geopolitical power in its 
claimed near abroad and beyond.  
 Central to these kinds of disinformation narratives is the creation and exploitation 
of the idea of an “Other,” who emerges Western “gender ideology” and is infiltrating 
Russia both physically and spiritually, threatening the spiritual architecture of the Russian 
system. The creation of an ‘Other’ has been a central political and propaganda tool of 
Russian leadership throughout both the Imperial and Soviet eras, and Muslim and Jewish 
populations and an idea of the ‘West’ have been otherized for hundreds of years. Because 
of this, the current rhetoric emerging from the Kremlin is a rhetorical return to past 
 
193 Fareer Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 1997), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/rise-illiberal-democracy.;  Steven Levitsky and Lucan 
A. Way, “Elections Without Democray: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 
13, no. 2 (April 2002). 
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political rhetoric and national identity, especially from the Imperial Era. However, there 
has been a recasting of characters and the creation of new enemies and threats. Most 
significantly, the otherization of LGBTQ+ individuals and the creation and exportation of 
the idea of weaponized Western ‘gender ideology’ is new to the playbook. Historical 
circumstances of the modern age have presented gender and sexuality-based groups as a 
useful enemy because the otherization of these groups fits well with the historical and 
cultural pattern that Russian leadership has established in the past of pure/impure 
dichotomies. By otherizing these groups, the Kremlin can present them as existing 
outside of the natural order, by design of the West, in order to undermine traditional 
Russian culture. The entire set of sexuality and gender-based narratives covered in this 
analysis present two sets of threats. The first is the physical threat of sexual violence at 
the hands of an ‘Other.’ The second is the spiritual threat of so-called Western gender 
ideology. In this way, the Kremlin presents the West as posing a dual threat: one of 
territorial and physical encroachment and one of spiritual destruction, purposefully 
penetrating the Russian spiritual and cultural bodies in order to destroy “Third Rome” 
and the divine future of the Russian state. 
Today, the Kremlin has successfully connected all of the designated ‘Others’ – 
the West, Jews, Muslims, and LGBTQ+ populations – into a conglomeration of an enemy 
that is often portrayed as being controlled by the West. In contemporary Kremlin 
rhetoric, the West is often tied to Islam, either through an idea of  extreme tolerance or as 
a military partnership meant to counter the Russian state; the West is portrayed as being 
controlled, often financially, by Jews, often taking the form of criticism of Open Society 
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Foundation and George Soros; the West is depicted as the creator and exporter of 
LGBTQ+ ‘ideology’ or “radical feminism” in order to penetrate and weaken the 
traditional Russian state both physically and spiritually. Now, the West is a total threat, a 
merging of all possible transgressions of Russian traditional cultural boundaries. 
Simultaneously, the Kremlin is able to present itself as the protector of traditional 
political and cultural systems in countries that fall within the sphere of influence. 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Three levels of action have become popular in the fight against disinformation 
worldwide: 1) government action; 2) social media platform action; 3) civil society group 
action. Any attempt to thwart the threat of disinformation must include all these of these 
groups and cannot exist simply as a checklist of activities to complete. With sexuality and 
gender-based narratives, which rely heavily on emotionally charged content, simple fact 
checking, or rationality is often not going to be enough. The understanding that 
disinformation emerges from a diverse range of actors with a diverse range of 
motivations, from material to political to religious, and that consumers of disinformation 
are diverse, is also essential.  
There are different categories of consumers of disinformation: those who are 
deeply ingratiated with conspiratorial worldview, and those who are simply looking for 
answers, who are often jaded and put off by traditional political systems, but who have 
not formed identity around a conspiratorial worldview. The understanding that 
intervention strategies will not be the same for all kinds of consumers is central to 
success. Many scholars have assumed that conspiratorial thinking is resistant to rational 
argumentation; however, the findings of Orosz et al. challenge that assumption and 
suggest that rational argumentation and ridicule of conspiratorial thinking may be 
effective intervention in the case of individuals who have not become completely 
ingratiated in the conspiratorial mindset.194  
 
194 Gabor Orosz et al., “Changing Conspiracy Beliefs through Rationality and Ridiculing,” Frontiers in 
Psychology (2016), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01525/full. 
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Fact checking has become perhaps the most common solution to the threat of 
disinformation on an individual level. However, simple fact checking has extremely 
significant shortcomings especially in defending against emotionally charged 
disinformation. Fact checking is an important action that should be continued in 
appropriate circumstances; but it does not contribute to actual meaningful change in 
societal resilience against disinformation. Fact checking should be paired with 
meaningful media literacy training, teaching consumers how to spot disinformation 
without outside fact checking. In today’s ‘post truth’ world, when consumers cannot even 
agree on the truth and question the integrity and unbiased nature of fact checking, the 
practice will not be effective.  
Porter and Wood have found that fact-checking is most effective when the fact-
checker is a highly credible source, and especially when the fact-checker is “surprising,” 
i.e. a Republican correcting another Republican or a Democrat correcting another 
Democrat.195 In addition, they and others have found that fact checking is most effective 
when the corrector provides a new frame for thinking about the issue, rather than simply 
dismissing it as wrong, and when the corrector does not directly challenge the consumer’s 
worldview and identity.196 This final characteristic is the biggest danger when 
considering sexuality and gender-based disinformation narratives. The Kremlin’s 
utilization of these narratives ties directly to the fact that they appeal to people’s identities 
 
195 Thomas Wood and Ethan Porter, “The elusive backfire effect: Mass attitudes’ steadfast factual 
adherence,” Political Behavior (2018).  
196 Brendan Nyhan, Ethan Porter, Jason Reifler, and Thomas J. Wood, “Taking Fact-Checks Literally But 
Not Seriously? The Effects of Journalistic Fact Checking on Factual Beliefs and Candidate Favorability,” 
Political Behavior (2019).  
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through religion and culture. When countering these narratives, a fact checker must be 
careful not to completely dismiss someone’s identity, as they immediately would lose 
credibility.  
On a national and international level, action to prevent the threat of 
disinformation has largely been disjointed and irregular. Although much work must be 
done on a national level to increase media literacy and societal resilience, with sexuality 
and gender-based disinformation narratives, the nation-state is often not the best actor to 
intervene. When a particular brand of gendered nationalism is being weaponized, a 
nation-state cannot effectively counter it. In this case, international institutions such as 
the European Union and the United Nations, as well as EU-US cooperative measures, are 
potentially the best solution. The primary recommendation here is that the United States 
and European Union establish a counter-disinformation coalition, which addresses joint 
threats and threats against the idea of Collective West.197 This coalition would need to 
bring together experts from different fields: politics, journalism, social media platforms, 
and civil society to speak on a regular basis regarding narrative threats and potential 
solutions.  
For the European Union specifically, increased funding and reorganization of the 
East Stratcom Unit is needed. The EastStratcom unit has been perpetually underfunded 
and politically unsupported at times, and, likely due to budget constraints, often conducts 
 
197 Annina Claesson, “Coming Together to Fight Fake News: Lessons from the European Approach to 
Disinformation,” CSIS Issue 17, no. 3 (2019). 
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basic fact-checking that will not be effective in the fight against sexuality and gender-
based disinformation narratives. In general, the EU should:  
1) Focus on media literacy. Media literacy programs have become more popular in 
Europe, but they should be the primary focus of the EU rather than efforts to take 
down, report, or ban disinformation itself. The reality is that rumors exist in 
society, but society must be able to, on average, be able to discern the truth. This 
could be done by incorporating media literacy into school curriculums from an 
early age and supporting continued-media education opportunities for all 
demographics. 
2) Increase the budget for counter-disinformation efforts. Although the portion of 
the EU budget for the East StratCom Task Force in 2019 increased from 1.9 
million to 5 million Euros, Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRS) alone has a 
budget that is more than double all of the EU’s counter-disinformation agencies 
combined.198 This is also not including the 1.4 billion Euros that the Kremlin 
spends on RT, Sputnik, and other mass media outlets.  
3) Understand the issue extends beyond election cycles. The threat of disinformation 
should not be taken seriously only during election cycles. Disinformation attempts 
to penetrate the target audience at all times in order to fundamentally change 
perceptions of society, politics, and life. There are, of course, political goals that 
often incentivize a propagandist. However, these goals are going to be best 
 
198 Nina Jankowicz, “Avoiding the Band-Aid Effect in Institutional Response to Disinformation and 
Hybrid Warfare,” Alliance for Securing Democracy, no. 21 (2019).  
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achieved if there is a constant deluge of disinformation far before an election. 
Framing the issue around elections creates a fundamental misunderstanding of 
how disinformation achieves intended results.  
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CONCLUSION 
Since his return to the presidency in 2012, Vladimir Putin has increasingly relied 
on the idea the West and its presumed associates as a threat to traditional gender roles and 
to legitimize and solidify his own heavy-handed rule. Vladimir Putin and his allies have 
reconstructed Russia’s national identity at the nexus of “’traditional values,’ patriotism, 
paternalism, strong statehood, and collectivism,” through performatively masculine state-
making.199 An essential tool in the Kremlin’s ideological warfare are sexuality and 
gender-based narratives in disinformation that targets both domestic and foreign 
audiences. The use of these kinds of narratives, which exploit emotions such as fear, 
anger, and disgust, and manipulate biases in human cognition, are cheap and effective 
means of furthering the Kremlin’s alternative worldview abroad and strengthening 
Putin’s rule domestically.  
Russian leadership has an extensive history of utilizing an outgroup as a political 
and propaganda tool – most often Jews, Muslims, and some idea of conspiring West. 
However, the Kremlin’s recent othering of LGBTQ+ populations presents a new pattern. 
The Kremlin has attempted to create a fear of Western ideology by manipulating targeted 
populations into fearing a territorial and spiritual encroachment from the West. 
According to the Kremlin’s propaganda, an embrace of Western multiculturalism will 
lead to significant populations of dangerous and threatening ‘Others’ that will bring 
increased sexual violence, moral deviancy, and eventual societal degradation. Most 
 
199 Alexandra Novitskaya, “Patriotism, sentiment, and male hysteria,” 12. 
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importantly, these groups will bring a deeper spiritual degradation that will weaken 
traditional views of the family, of gender roles, and of religion.  
With the global rise of competitive authoritarianism in an era of renewed great-
power competition, scholars and politicians have warned of ideological competition as a 
result of authoritarian actors – China and Russia – who wish to create an exportable form 
of illiberal, authoritarian governance. In the age of the internet, social media, and 
increasing distrust in institutions, social resilience against these forces is diminishing and 
the U.S. and many European countries are indeed at increased risk. However, in the 
Russian case, the goal is not only be to create an alternative political system to that in the 
West, but an alternative cultural and societal structure that is built on a specific view of 
traditionality, gender norms, and religion.  
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